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TENOR OF OUR TIMES

Volume VI, Spring 2017



COVER

Neil Williamson. *Castle Monument*. February 16, 2015,
<https://www.flickr.com/photos/neillwphoto/16558180731>.

TENOR OF OUR TIMES

Volume VI, Spring 2017

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The Raymond L. Muncy Scholarship is a one-time financial award for those undergraduate students at Harding University majoring in History who demonstrate exceptional scholarship, research, and Christian character. The scholarship was created to honor the late Raymond L. Muncy, Chairman of the Department of History and Social Sciences from 1965-1993. His teaching, mentoring, and scholarship modeled the best in Christian education. Applied toward tuition, the award is granted over the span of a single academic year. The award is presented annually at the Department of History and Political Science Banquet.



Primary Award Winner

“Souls vs. Shoes: Walter Rauschenbusch and the Social Gospel” by Sam Klein



Secondary Award Winner

"We the People: Protecting Natural Rights from a Bill of Rights" by Julia Wilcox

PHI ALPHA THETA ARKANSAS REGIONAL CONFERENCE

On March 25, 2017, Harding University hosted the Phi Alpha Theta Arkansas Regional Conference. Phi Alpha Theta is a national honor society for undergraduate and graduate students as well as professors of history. Established on March 17, 1921, at the University of Arkansas by Professor Nels Cleven, Phi Alpha Theta now has over 400,000 members with another 9,000 students being inducted each year.¹ With 970 different chapters nationwide, Harding University's Eta Phi chapter was pleased to receive the opportunity to host this year's regional conference.

The Phi Alpha Theta conference provides students and professors alike the platform to present their scholarly works. This year, several Harding University members presented their historical research and field experiences along with students and professors from the University of Arkansas Monticello, Arkansas State University, Arkansas Tech University, and the University of Central Arkansas. Harding University's Eta Phi chapter would like to specially thank Dr. Warren Casey, Dr. Laquita Saunders, Mark Christ, the Arkansas State Archives, Kara Ellis, Angela Gibbs, and Harding University's faculty for their participation in the conference.

Report by Mary Goode
Photos by Hannah Clifton

HARDING UNIVERSITY PRESENTERS



Sam Aly

*The Primo de Rivera Dictatorship & the
Foundations of Authoritarianism in Spain
(1923-30)*



Curt Baker

The Lighthouse of Pharos: A Narrative

¹“About,” *Phi Alpha Theta National History Honor Society*, 2017, <http://phialphatheta.org/about>.



Hannah Clifton

New Orleans Spiritualism & Afro-Creole Activism



Stryder Matthews

The Dialectic of Ralph Waldo Emerson's Essays

GUEST PRESENTERS

Rynn Hamilton, University of Arkansas Monticello
Rhapsody in Time: Lessons from Gershwin & the Jazz Age

Edward Harthorn, Arkansas State University
Dispensations & Machinations: Comparative Perceptions of 1670s India

Cheri L. Miller, University of Arkansas Monticello
3ASI: A Mound's Tale

Hampton N. Roy, Arkansas Tech University
The Moon & Stars: Muslim Efforts to Save Jews during the Shoah

Katelyn Trammell, University of Central Arkansas
Air, Sea, & Land: Environmental Factors & Their Effects on the Omaha & Utah Beach Landings

William Walker, Arkansas State University
War Tunnel Heritage: The Secret Subterranean Passage Beneath Bonifacio Global City in Metro Manila

SPECIAL PRESENTATIONS



Arkansas State Archives
Traveling Exhibit
The Great War: Arkansas in World War I



Mark Christ
Commemorating World War I in Arkansas



Panel on Public History
Kara Ellis, Archivist at William J. Clinton Presidential Library

Angela Gibbs, Curator at Jacksonport County Courthouse Museum

Hannah Wood, Special Collections Librarian at Brackett Library

Award Winners: (left to right)

William Walker

1st place Graduate Paper

Sam Aly

1st place Undergraduate Paper

Cheri Miller

Honorable Mention

Rynn Hamilton

2nd place Undergraduate Paper



ILLUSTRATIONS




Figure 1 (above left): Dome of the Baptistery of the Orthodox, Ravenna

Figure 2 (above right): Carl von Clausewitz

Figure 3 (below): Map of Roman Empire showing major grain regions
Original map by Wikimedia user Varana, “The Roman Empire in 44 BC,”
(Nov 24, 2006). Adapted for *Tenor of Our Times* by Sam Aly.

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ART AND ECONOMICS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD



Articles

The Gracchi and the Era of Grain Reform in Ancient Rome

by Samuel B. Aly

The Lighthouse at Pharos – A Narrative

by Curt Baker

Windows to the Divine: The Development of Byzantine Art

by Sam Klein



Sam Aly is a junior history major from Pegram, Tennessee. He served as School Programs Intern at the Country Music Hall of Fame and Museum in Nashville, Tennessee during the summer of 2016. Sam also participates in his social club at Harding, Kyodai, and has been elected president for the 2017-18 school year. He is interested in pairing teaching English overseas and mission work, and will be serving in Germany for a missions internship in the summer of 2017.

THE GRACCHI AND THE ERA OF GRAIN REFORM IN ANCIENT ROME

By Samuel B. Aly

Rome's growing population in the late Republic was a positive sign. However, the metropolis was becoming larger than any before, indeed much larger. Exponential expansion and the booming capital city itself both forced society to adapt to an increasingly condensed metropolis. The days of food provisions from the city's hinterland were over; Republican officials struggled to find ways to bolster the traditional method of supply. Fortunately, the developing trade network across the Mediterranean incrementally provided a solution to the problem. Republican officials had to find a way to facilitate the introduction of large-scale shipping in a way that allowed an effective, organized distribution of the grain that was so essential to the diet of ancient commoners. Towards the end of the second-century BC, the dichotomy between landowners and lesser members of society quickly approached a breaking point. Beginning in 123 BC, a century-long era of wide-ranging farming and grain reform began under the Gracchus brothers, Tiberius and Gaius, which determined the course of Roman grain distribution for centuries.

Why was grain so imperative for Rome? In short, grains were the cheapest, most efficient foodstuffs that subsisted in the majority of the ancient Mediterranean. They were most often measured by the *modius*, an amount equal to about 2.4 gallons of modern U.S. measurement.¹ Wheat and barley were the primary two forms of cereals in the region as they were most appropriate and most bountiful in its distinct soil.² Barley was easier to produce in substandard soil and provided less nutrition, so it was primarily a product for the poor in the Roman grain market.³ One problem that the population had to deal with once it received the grain was processing the un-milled, raw material. Many who were unable to afford milling grain into flour or baking it into bread simply ate it as porridge or flat cakes.⁴

¹ Lesley Adkins and Roy A. Adkins, *Handbook to Life in Ancient Rome* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 314.

² Geoffrey Rickman, *The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 5.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Peter Garnsey, "Mass Diet and Nutrition in the City of Rome," in *Cities, Peasants, and Food in Classical Antiquity: Essays in Social and Economic History*, ed. Walter Scheidel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 237.

To emphasize the importance of the cereals that were shipped to Rome every year, Tacitus wrote that the lower classes of the city “[had] no public interests save the grain supply.”⁵ Ammianus Marcellus recounts a story from the city under threat of a possible shortage in 359 AD, several centuries after the implementation of the grain distribution. An angry mob was openly threatening Tertullus, a prefect in charge of the *annona*, though it might have been unfair to hold the man in charge accountable for the stormy weather that was keeping the grain ships away.⁶ To appease the boiling crowd, he presented his young sons for all to see and declared that even they would suffer the same fate as the rest of the citizenry. Luckily for Tertullus, his sons, and the rest of Rome, the ships finally did arrive and provide the city with the food it needed. The supply was no small matter for the people or the leaders of Rome.

The food supply remains one of the best ways to estimate of Rome’s population, given that average human food consumption is a relatively constant value throughout history.⁷ Food consumption in terms of Roman *modii* of grain is recorded in a variety of sources, from Cato to Sallust to Seneca. Barley and wheat contained the best price-to-calorie ratio in the diet of the ancient world and therefore were absolutely essential for the lower classes of burgeoning late-Republican Rome.⁸ Whitney Oates asserts that by compiling and examining the statistics from these ancient writings, it is safe to assume a monthly average of four *modii* of grain provided for each person living in Rome.⁹ This includes every man, woman, or child, although the five *modii* distributions in the late Republic were only for adult men. However, it is important to remember that all five *modii* may not have been available to its recipient due to deterioration over time or splitting the grain among multiple members of a household.¹⁰ Oates’ estimate for the population of metropolitan Rome under Augustus came to 1,125,000, although the more common estimate is under one million.¹¹

The population question arises when considering the necessity of cheap grain for the people of Rome. Common laborers and slaves represented a significant portion of the population of Rome, although it is difficult to

⁵ Tacitus, *Histories*, trans. C.H. Moore. Loeb Classical Library (1931), 4.38.

⁶ Ammianus Marcellus, *Res Gestae*, trans. J.C. Rolfe, Loeb Classical Library, vol. I (1935), 19.10.1-4.

⁷ Whitney J. Oates, “The Population of Rome,” *Classical Philology* 29, no. 2 (April 1934): 103-4.

⁸ Geoffrey Rickman, “The Grain Trade Under the Roman Empire,” *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome* 36 (1980): 262.

⁹ Oates, 106.

¹⁰ Garnsey, 236.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 109.

determine the exact number because the majority of records only include the citizenry of the city. These workers had an extremely unstable income, often the result of seasonal employment, which led to minimal buying power.¹²

Not only was Rome the largest known city to exist up to that point, its food supply system was different from other grand capitals of the ancient world. Alexandria, Antioch, and Carthage relied on the hinterland for their grain, with only a very small percentage of their supply being shipped from elsewhere in the Mediterranean.¹³ In contrast, Rome relied extremely heavily on shipments from several agricultural powerhouses around the sea. As the 200s BC drew to a close, there were two questions: how could the city itself attain enough grain to feed its people? And, even if the grain could be found, how could it be made accessible to all of the classes of society?

The empire that was soon to bud under Augustus provided fertile lands with which to sustain Rome. The Mediterranean provided a perfect location for a burgeoning political empire (see Figure 3). The sea, ‘Mare Nostrum,’ allowed for easy transport and shipping due to its relatively short width and temperate climate. The empire’s capital could not have been placed in a more favorable region. Rome enjoyed access to almost any region in the known world, from the Levant to Iberia to Libya. In addition, the port of Ostia, at the base of the Tiber River, supplied a perfect place for ships to dock and send their product in barges to the capital. This geographical advantage for agricultural trade had been seen before with the colossal role that Rhodes (between Crimea and Egypt, two of the largest suppliers) had played in supplying Alexander’s Greece with grain.¹⁴

Cicero referred to Sicily, Africa, and Sardinia as “the three great granaries of the republic.”¹⁵ Indeed, as evidence of his political accomplishment in Sicily, he mentions his prowess in providing large shipments of grain for Rome during a food shortage.¹⁶ Sicily was the first of these provinces to adjoin to Rome. Next came Sardinia, which had taxes of grain rather than money, and finally Egypt and Africa.¹⁷

¹² Paul Erdkamp, *The Grain Market in the Roman Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 259.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 260.

¹⁴ Lionel Casson, “The Grain Trade of the Hellenistic World,” *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 85 (1954): 172.

¹⁵ Cicero, *On Pompey’s Command (De Imperio)*, trans. Ingo Gildenhard and Louise Hodgson et. al. Classics Library, 34.

¹⁶ Cicero, *How to Run a Country: An Ancient Guide for Modern Leaders*, trans. Phillip Freeman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 14.

¹⁷ Geoffrey Rickman, *The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome*, 9.

Although there is much debate about the validity of grain import statistics during the Principate, sources from within the Empire agree that Egypt was a vital part of Rome's supply line. Aurelius Victor wrote in the fourth century AD that twenty million allotments of grain were shipped annually from Egypt specifically for the city of Rome during the reign of Augustus.¹⁸ This number is generally assumed to be incorrect due to ancient estimation methods and Aurelius' lack of chronologically proximity, but it is surely intended as fact based on the huge fleets of grain ships that flooded into the port of Ostia during a year. However, Egypt eventually became less important due to the development of the North African agricultural industry, even under the Principate.¹⁹

It has been thoroughly established that Egypt, Africa, Sardinia, and Sicily had enough grain to provide for the booming Italian metropolis, but who was going to organize that supply's administration? This question is answered extensively by ancient sources. The open market could not be relied on for an annual project of such epic proportions; there were few men who had the resources and fewer who would use their power to support the plebians of Rome. This left the task in the hands of political authorities whose role in society was dependent on keeping the populace well-fed and secure.²⁰

A significant amount of Roman political efforts from the late Republic to the Principate focused on land and grain distribution. The origins of Roman agricultural reform and the grain ration that became a characteristic of Roman life are found in the second century BC with a pair of great politicians and brothers, the Gracchi. Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus activated a sweeping, effective trend of reform that brought grain to the people of Rome in an increasingly accessible manner.

Plutarch provides much of what is known about the Gracchi as people. As the older brother, Tiberius was "gentle and composed," while Gaius was "highly strung and impassioned."²¹ In an article on the motivations of the Gracchan reformers, Solomon Katz offers a look into the effects their divergent personalities had on their political actions. Ancient sources provide an image of the elder Gracchi as an idealistic and practical politician when it came to his

¹⁸ Aurelius Victor, *Epitome De Caesaribus*, trans. Thomas M. Banchich (Buffalo, New York: Canisius College, 2009), 1.6.

¹⁹ Geoffrey Rickman, *The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome*, 234.

²⁰ W. L. Westermann. "Aelius Gallus and the Reorganization of the Irrigation System of Egypt under Augustus," *Classical Philology* 12, no. 3 (July 1917): 237.

²¹ Plutarch, *Makers of Rome: Nine Lives*, trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1987), 154.

reforms of Roman agriculture. However, Gaius, zealous and outspoken, seemed to be more of a true social reformer, valuing above all an “unequivocal fashion the sovereignty of the people.”²² Plutarch evokes an image of Gaius as a fervent orator on the people’s side. He states that “Gaius was the first Roman to stride up and down the rostra and wrench his toga off his shoulder,” a sign of extreme emotion and distress, and that his speeches “tended to electrify his audience and [were] impassioned to the point of exaggeration.”²³ By contrast, level-headed Tiberius once negotiated an agreement with the Numantines that saved the Roman army from a potentially devastating massacre of 20,000 full citizens, plus slaves and other companions.²⁴

These men were powerful orators and politicians that used their talents with the populace for reform. Tiberius’ main agrarian law dealt with equitable land distribution after the capture of enemy territory. Usually, some land was auctioned off and the rest was considered public land in which the poor could reside and work for a small rent. A law was introduced to prevent the rich from controlling all of said land, but it was circumvented through false names of fictional peasants.²⁵ Tiberius introduced legislation that sought to allot this land to the poor, including men who had fought for the Roman army but were returning from service with nowhere to live because of monopolistic landowners. His unique blend of practicality and idealism were apparent in this case. Tiberius intended to “rebuild the army by a system of small land grants which would at the same time curb the growing slave menace.”²⁶ While Tiberius Gracchus was certainly thinking of the well-being of the poor of Roman society, he primarily focused on returning the agricultural state of the republic to a highly functioning industry that aligned the goals of the government and the common people.

Tiberius Gracchus’ reforms went against the desires of the aristocratic and wealthy members of the Senate, many the very landowners that Tiberius sought to control. During the process of sanctioning the bill, he bypassed the Senate in favor of the popular assembly, a legal but extremely unorthodox choice. Not to be outwitted, the aristocratic Senators convinced an assembly member named Octavius to veto the law. Tiberius then made the ill-conceived and highly controversial decision to have the senator deposed by forcibly

²² Solomon Katz, “The Gracchi: An Essay in Interpretation,” *The Classical Journal* 38, no. 2 (November 1942): 74.

²³ Plutarch, *Makers of Rome*, 155.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 157-8.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 160.

²⁶ Katz, 71.

removing him from the chamber and pushed the proposal into law. This action was Tiberius' downfall. His conduct "had offended not only the aristocratic party but even the people."²⁷ On the day he was to be up for reelection, his supporters heard of a plot to kill Tiberius and a riot broke out in the streets of Rome. The aristocrats of the Senate themselves emerged from their chambers and murdered Tiberius Gracchus.²⁸

This event was a turning point in the eyes of many second-century Romans. David Stockton compares Rome's atmosphere to the "doubtful truce" that Thucydides spoke of describing the Peace of Nicias during the Peloponnesian War.²⁹ The citizenry witnessed unrestrained lawlessness, not in a backwards province but the great city of Rome itself, because of political disagreements among the aristocrats. An incontestable mixture of regret and fear seemed to loom over the city until other legislation provided an appropriate diversion from the events of 123 BC.

One reason for including Tiberius Gracchus in the discussion of Roman grain laws is the effect his policies and death had on his younger brother. However, the agrarian laws he passed and the implications that can be taken from his reform are more important. The Roman agricultural system needed reorganization, mostly because of the burgeoning number of rural unemployed commoners. Under authority of the previous laws, the elite landowners grew more powerful while the poor were pushed out completely. Tiberius' agrarian laws helped provide a more stable base for the Rome-adjacent poor and improve the efficiency and output of the Roman agricultural hinterland.

After Tiberius' death, Gaius retreated from politics and public life for a spell. Plutarch speculates that he could have been either afraid of his brother's murderers or playing the victim to make them seem even more vile.³⁰ In either case, he "had been quiet for some time after his brother's death, but since many of the senators treated him scornfully he announced himself as a candidate for the office of tribune."³¹

Gaius' return to the political stage was anything but timid. After winning the position of tribune, his agenda consisted of one item: reform. From the beginning of the reemergence of Gaius Gracchus, everyone in Rome knew he was against the Senate and aristocracy. He introduced law after law and

²⁷ Plutarch, *Makers of Rome*, 167.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 172.

²⁹ David Stockton, *The Gracchi* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979), 87.

³⁰ Plutarch, *Makers of Rome*, 175.

³¹ Appian, *Histories*, trans. Horace White (Loeb Classical Library, 1913), 1.21.

earned for himself “the wholehearted devotion of the people.”³² Unfortunately, his legislation also drove him farther and farther away from his fellow tribunes. After the accidental death of one of his enemies’ attendants at the hands of his supporters, his opponents became even more numerous and determined to put a stop to his rabble-rousing antics. After a regrettable series of events, the city was thrown into uproar and Gaius was chased around the city until he finally committed suicide in a sacred grove.³³ Gaius’ desecrated body was thrown into the Tiber and washed away, but his legacy and the laws he managed to pass, had an effect that spanned centuries.

The most important of Gaius’ laws amending the administration of grain in Rome, the reason why the Gracchi should be considered the stimulant of this reform, is the *lex frumentaria* (for specificity, the *lex Sempronia frumentaria*), which Gaius passed in 123 BC. The law provided a monthly distribution of grain to Roman citizens at a set cost (six and 1/3 *asses* per *modius*), which was extremely beneficial for the Roman plebs who would be considered middle class by today’s standards. He paid for this by reorganizing the taxation system of Asian provinces so as to be more efficient for the capital’s revenue.³⁴ The law’s main benefit, maybe one of the main motivations behind it, was the protection it provided from price fluctuations in the open market.³⁵ The law’s organization may initially seem similar to a welfare system, but the *lex frumentaria* was not inherently aimed at aiding the poor or needy. However, for the Romans, this distribution system was groundbreaking and opened a new political debate that would rage on in the Roman legislature.

Patrons gifting grain to their clients, politicians to their supporters, was not unusual. In fact, Gaius Gracchus’ *lex frumentaria* could be considered a way to regulate and aid this philanthropy. Generosity of the well-to-do was not without strings attached; it was often used to buy votes from the middle classes. Alternatively, the law of Gaius Gracchus irked rich politicians who were looking to buy votes because fewer and fewer plebeians were reliant on their aid due to lower grain prices, and were therefore less likely to accept it.

Gaius started a practice that many politicians utilized later in the century—winning over support by employing political power to give food benefits to the electorate.³⁶ Grain distribution policies became quite common in

³² Plutarch, *Makers of Rome*, 184.

³³ *Ibid.*, 191.

³⁴ Rickman, *The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome*, 172.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 160.

³⁶ Erdkamp, 241.

the centuries following the *lex frumentaria*. Robert Rowland asserts that the law did very little to help the impoverished of the city, but rather only helped the plebs who already had some access to grain on the open market.³⁷ Despite the overall discrimination against the lower classes, it can be argued that benefits may have trickled down from the middle class to the poor through the utilization of the *annona* as a market manipulation.³⁸ Essentially, though grain was not distributed to all, all benefited from the influx of cheap grain that drove down market prices.

The period between the Gracchi and Augustus represents an important development of the Roman grain distribution system. In his book *The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome*, published in 1980, Geoffrey Rickman outlines three sections that demarcate the progression of Roman legislation on grain.³⁹ Through this categorization, the first two sections lie within the century of reform started by Gracchan reform. The first begins with Gaius Gracchus' grain law in 123 BC and ends with Clodius in 58 BC. The second section starts with Pompey's institution of the *cura annonae* in 57 BC and continues through the beginning of the Principate. The final section covers the time after Augustus, which was not influenced by the Gracchi.

As stated before, there were many adjustments to the system of grain distribution in the century after the *lex frumentaria*. Rowland recounts a summary of distribution reformers, or attempted reformers, over the sixty years: Octavius, Saturnius, Drusus, Lepidus, Cato the Younger, and Clodius.⁴⁰ Gracchan reform catalyzed this scattered, almost frenetic reformation of laws dealing with the metropolitan grain supply.⁴¹

The first in this list is a magistrate named only as M. Octavius, who introduced the *lex Octavia frumentaria*. The law replaced and nullified Gaius Gracchus' earlier grain distribution law. It was intended to lower the deficit the treasury had been running since the establishment of the Gracchan law without stirring up the plebs who were beneficiaries.⁴² There are many ways this could have been achieved: lowering the price of a distribution, lowering the amount of grain in a distribution, or reducing the number of recipients. J. G. Schovánek

³⁷ Robert Rowland, "The 'Very Poor' and the Grain Dole at Rome and Oxyrhynchus," *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 21 (1976): 69.

³⁸ Erdkamp, 243.

³⁹ Rickman, *The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome*, 157.

⁴⁰ Rowland, 70-2.

⁴¹ Rickman, *The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome*, 157.

⁴² J. G. Schovánek, "The Provisions of the 'Lex Octavia Frumentaria,'" *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 26, no. 3 (1977): 378.

examines the possible effects of Octavius' law in his paper "The Provisions of the 'Lex Octavia Frumentaria.'" After assessing the scant evidence gathered from first-century sources, he asserts that the law "first introduced the stipulations legally restricting the distributions to the poorest classes of citizens as well as those limiting the monthly individual ration to five modii."⁴³ Dating the law is complex, although common estimates range between 121 and 119 BC, as an almost retaliatory measure to Gaius' death, or perhaps in the 90s BC.⁴⁴

After the *lex Octavia* began a series of distribution laws which were systematically passed and repealed by successive politicians. Sulla's consulship was responsible for the repeal of the *lex Octavia frumentaria*, but Lepidus soon proposed a replacement.⁴⁵ In a rousing speech recorded in Sallust's *Histories*, he declared, "The Roman people, lately ruler of the nations, now stripped of power, repute and rights, without the means to live and an object of contempt, does not even retain the rations of slaves."⁴⁶ Because there is little primary evidence from this period, it remains undetermined whether he actually passed a law or not. The fact is somewhat inconsequential because in 78 BC another distribution law was passed, meaning that either Lepidus' law was successful initially but quickly repealed, or his bill was never made into law in the first place.⁴⁷

Cato the Younger's grain law in 62 BC holds special importance in the era of reform. Pirates had been a growing issue for the Republic over the early-to-mid first century, stopping supply lines and ransacking Sicilian grain ships on which Rome so desperately relied. Cato successfully avoided an uprising of Roman denizens, frightened at the prospect of going without enough food for the winter, by extending the distributions of grain to the "poor and landless multitudes."⁴⁸ This follows the pattern that was earlier established by Gaius Gracchus; that political success, or in this case domestic peace, could be achieved by providing easier access to the food supply for the poor and previously unentitled.

To cap Rickman's first category of grain distribution laws, one must look to Clodius' tribuneship in 58 BC. Clodius was the first to turn the price

⁴³ Schovánek, 381.

⁴⁴ Rickman, *The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome*, 161-2.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 166.

⁴⁶ Sallust, "Speech of the Consul Lepidus to the Roman People," in *Histories*, trans. John C. Rolfe (Loeb Classical Library, 1931), 11.

⁴⁷ Rickman, *The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome*, 166.

⁴⁸ Plutarch, "Life of Cato the Younger," in *The Parallel Lives*, vol. 8, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Loeb Classical Library, 1923), 26.1.

controlled grain into a free dole for its recipients. Since the time of Gaius Gracchus, the price per unit had oscillated to the benefit of either the plebs or the Republic's revenue. It was finally settled. Grain recipients no longer paid for their food, Clodius arranged it to be paid for by the newly-annexed Cyprus and sale of royal lands there.⁴⁹ This aspect of the legislation provides a parallel to Gaius' reorganization of Asia. The model set by the Gracchan reformer was still effective nearly seven decades later.

Clodius' *lex* clearly had great effect on the people of the day, but it also had deeper implications than just what was stated in the law. The free distribution of grain was now a right of the Roman citizen, something that would be almost impossible to repeal without significant discontent or even revolt. This example of government interference went further than just affecting distributions; it assumed control over farms, land, and stores of grain that contributed to the Roman supply.⁵⁰ Rickman writes that both Cato's and Clodius' laws may or may not be partially responsible for inflated first-century prices, but the much more important factor was the piracy epidemic that afflicted the Mediterranean.⁵¹ The sea was no longer safe. Something had to be done.

Grain ships were having trouble reaching Rome from Sicily and Sardinia, let alone those venturing from as far away as Egypt or Africa. Merchants were less likely to send shipments, for good reason. After several failed attempts at controlling the growing menace that spanned decades, Pompey was given complete control of a fleet of up to five hundred ships in 67 BC for a maximum of three years.⁵² At long last, Rome had found a successful measure. Ancient sources did not report large scale piracy for centuries afterwards. Pompey's swift and severe suppression of the problem quieted grain price fluctuations in the city and reopened the Mediterranean trade network that had been slowly dwindling.

After his remarkable success on the sea, Pompey was given complete control of the grain supply of the Roman world in 57 BC. He took on this task with his usual vigor. That same year, Pompey personally orchestrated the purchase of cheap grain around the Mediterranean.⁵³ Once, after pushing his storm-threatened grain fleet to continue sailing, "he filled the sea with ships and

⁴⁹ Rickman, *The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome*, 172.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, 51.

⁵³ Peter Temin, "Wheat Prices and Trade in the Early Roman Empire," in *The Roman Market Economy*, Princeton University Press (2013): 33.

the markets with grain, so that the excess of what he had provided sufficed also for foreign peoples, and there was an abundant overflow, as from a spring, for all.”⁵⁴ It seems clear that Pompey’s approach to this five-year appointment was circumstantial; he interfered when necessary.⁵⁵ With this singular, case-by-case approach to grain shortages, Pompey almost single-handedly stabilized the Roman grain network throughout the Mediterranean in the mid-50s BC.

Julius Caesar’s role in the grain distribution was also significant. Fewer policies and rules changed during his reign relative to the somewhat obsessive grain legislation reform of the early first century BC. However, he did create *aediles cereals*, officials that dealt with Roman grain supply issues, including distributions, the market, and trade.⁵⁶ Many of Caesar’s prospective policies focused on consolidation and reorganization of the number, record-keeping, and method of receipt, of the beneficiaries of the grain dole. However, his assassination did cut many plans short and the unfulfilled policies were left in the hands of Augustus.

In the time of Augustus the *annona* provided free monthly grain in distributions of five *modii* each for only 150,000 people.⁵⁷ Augustus provided grain to the people during many shortages throughout his rule. In his *Deeds of the Divine Augustus (Res Gestae)*, Augustus states several instances of these measures. The number of recipients reached as high 320,000 in 5 BC as a temporary measure to alleviate a food shortage.⁵⁸ Augustus provided grain to smaller amounts of people several times during his reign, even as often as three times within two years (24-23 BC).

According to Cassius Dio, Augustus followed in Caesar’s footsteps by assigning magistrates to the charge of grain, although his officers were especially focused on distribution. When Rome fell into disease and famine, the people came to Augustus petitioning him both to become dictator and to take control of the grain supply, the latter of which he accepted.⁵⁹ “. . . Augustus further provided that, for the distribution of grain, one candidate, who must have served as praetor three years previously, should be nominated each year by each

⁵⁴ Plutarch, “Life of Pompey,” in *The Parallel Lives*, vol. 5, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Loeb Classical Library, 1923), 50.2.

⁵⁵ Temin, 33.

⁵⁶ Cassius Dio, *Roman History*, trans. Earnest Cary, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 6 (1917), 43.51.3

⁵⁷ Jerome Carcopino, *Daily Life in Ancient Rome*, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 16.

⁵⁸ Augustus, *Deeds of the Divine Augustus*, trans. Thomas Bushnell (1998), 15.

⁵⁹ Cassius Dio, 54.1.3.

of the officials then serving, and that, from these nominees, four men should be chosen by lot to serve in succession as distributors of grain.”⁶⁰

Augustus also implemented a more efficient system of distribution by providing tickets of entitlement, *tesserae frumentariae*, which Suetonius records in his *Life of Augustus*. “He revised the lists of the people district by district, and to prevent the commons from being called away from their occupations too often because of the distributions of grain, he determined to give out tickets for four months' supply three times a year; but at their urgent request he allowed a return to the old custom of receiving a share every month.”⁶¹ This kind of foresight is exactly what made Augustus deserving of the authority he received. These *tesserae* improved efficiency for both the state and the recipients, while also allowing for easier recognition of those who were entitled to the dole.

The distribution and administration of grain did not end with Augustus. As the empire developed there emerges a rich history of the food supply in the provinces as well as the city of Rome. As early as AD 100, *frumentarii* were provincial Roman officials subordinate to the governor who occupied a wide variety of roles, but their function was the supply of grain for a city or military force.⁶² It is important to remember that Augustus began organizing the grain network for the military in addition to all of the domestic policies he implemented.

Augustus' administration of the food supply represents the end of a significant trend in Roman history. The city of Rome had developed over centuries into the largest metropolis the known world had ever seen, generating an urgent need for reorganization of the food supply. The Mediterranean provided rich agricultural production, most significantly in Sicily, Sardinia, Africa, and Egypt, which allowed Rome to survive. Ample grain supplies led many politicians to find ways to provide the staple to the citizens of Rome in an accessible and affordable manner. Pioneering this reform were the Gracchi, Tiberius and Gaius, who first introduced widespread grain reform of an aging, unequal system. Laws were altered, amended, and replaced several times over the course of a century. The grain distribution established a new form of social and political interaction between politicians and the common people. Despite all of the complications and disputes over the issue, by the early Principate period a

⁶⁰ Cassius Dio, 54.17.1.

⁶¹ Suetonius, “Life of Augustus,” in *The Lives of the Twelve Caesars*, trans. J. C. Rolfe (Loeb Classical Library, 1913), 40.2.

⁶² William G. Sinnigen, “The Origins of the ‘Frumentarii,’” *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome* 27 (1962): 14-15.

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solid agricultural and political foundation had been established for the supply and administration of grain in Rome.



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THE LIGHTHOUSE OF PHAROS: A NARRATIVE

By Curt Baker

The word “Pharos” originally referred to either a small island off the coast of Alexandria or the ancient wonder of the world – the brilliant and magnificent lighthouse – that once sat upon it. This term has evolved, however, and now a derivation of “Pharos” is the word for lighthouse in multiple languages and the term “pharology” denotes the study of lighthouses. The transition of a word from holding such specific meaning to one that encompasses an entire field of study is reflective of the colossal significance of the Pharos, the original lighthouse. A member of an elite class of structures — the seven wonders of the world — Pharos served both to guide sailors into the grand ports of Alexandria, thus contributing to the economic success of her host city, and as a physical reminder of Alexander the Great’s expansionism and the dominating spread of Greek influence across the ancient world. Under the rule of Ptolemy I Soter, Alexandria reached the pinnacle of economic and cultural significance in the Mediterranean. Ptolemy I held great pride in his extraordinary city, evidenced in the developments he brought to Alexandria and culminating in his patronage of the marvelous lighthouse. The story begins with Alexander the Great in 331 BC after his victory in Tyre.¹

After the battle, Alexander led his army southwest towards Egypt, then ruled by Mazaces, a viceroy of Darius the king of Persia.² Alexander accepted the surrender of Mazaces, established garrisons, and supplanted Persian rule in Egypt.³ In his tour of the countryside Alexander “sailed around the Marian lake, and disembarked where is now situated the city of Alexandria...the position seemed to him a very fine one in which to found a city...”⁴

Alexander’s positive assessment of the location was understandable — the site was ideal. The area that Alexander chose was a high, flat strip of land running parallel with the coast of the Mediterranean near the western extremity of the Nile Delta.⁵ A gradual decline to the south of this high ground led to Lake Mareotis or Marian/Mariut.⁶ On the banks of this lake sat a collection of

¹ Arrian, *The Anabasis of Alexander: Or, the History of the Wars and Conquests of Alexander the Great* (Forgotten Books, 2014), 140.

² Arrian, 140.

³ Ibid., 141.

⁴ Ibid., 141.

⁵ P.M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 1972), 5.

⁶ Fraser, 3.

agriculturally-based villages commonly referred to as Rhakotis, which took advantage of the excellent soil around the Nile to plant vineyards and produce oil.⁷ To the east ran the Canopic branch of the Nile, accessible through three canals.⁸ West of Alexander's location lay desert, eventually the location of the Necropolis.⁹ North of the strip rested a large, deep bay, protected from the harsh Mediterranean Sea by the island of Pharos.¹⁰ Even the weather seemed to favor Alexander's choice — a combination of the sea breeze from the Mediterranean and the consistent rising of the Nile kept temperatures cool during the summer when other cities suffered in the heat.¹¹ Alexander, thrilled about finding such an ideal spot for the city that would bear his name, immediately began planning the foundations, outlining buildings and walls in barley from his supply train.¹² In a disturbing omen for Alexander, birds flew down and ate the grain.¹³ However, Alexander's advisors and soothsayers insisted that the omen indicated prosperity and abundance for the city.¹⁴

By the time construction of the lighthouse began between 280 and 270 BC under Ptolemy I, Alexandria had fulfilled the prophecy of economic wealth and metropolitan growth.¹⁵ Ptolemy I, who served in Alexander's army during the Macedonian campaign against Persia, gained control of Egypt upon Alexander's death in 323 BC. A former companion and bodyguard to Alexander, Ptolemy I successfully established Alexandria as a thriving center of international trade and rapid urbanization.¹⁶ Strabo describes the city as being 30 stadia (roughly 4700 meters) long and eight stadia (roughly 1200 meters) wide.¹⁷ The physical growth of the city from Alexander's plans in grain to the flourishing center less than a century later point to this work by Ptolemy.

In the third century BC, Alexandria contained five distinct sectors, each populated nearly exclusively by a specific demographic.¹⁸ These included

⁷ Kimberly Williams, *Alexandria and the Sea: Maritime Origins and Underwater Exploration* (Tampa, FL: Sharp Books International, 2004), 12.

⁸ Thomas C. Clarie, *A lighthouse for Alexandria: Pharos, Ancient Wonder of the World* (Portsmouth, NH: Back Channel Press, 2008), 28.

⁹ Clarie, 28.

¹⁰ Fraser, 5.

¹¹ Strabo, *Geography*, trans. Horace Leonard Jones, Loeb Classical Library Online, 8, 1932, book 17, p.32.

¹² Arrian, 143.

¹³ Clarie, 17.

¹⁴ Arrian, 143.

¹⁵ Fraser, 20.

¹⁶ Clarie, 37.

¹⁷ Strabo, 17.33.

¹⁸ Fraser, 34.

communities from Macedon, Thrace, the Aegean Islands, Asia Minor, and Jews from the Levant.¹⁹ In addition, the number of non-citizens increased during the time of Ptolemaic rule.²⁰ Two main streets bisected the city, each large enough for pedestrians and wheeled carriages.²¹ One of these streets ran from the Canopic gate on the eastern edge of Alexandria to the Necropolis in the west, stretching five miles long and 200 feet wide.²² Other streets formed a grid system, which crisscrossed the city and intersected at right angles.²³ Walls provided safety to the city, only penetrable through the eastern, western, and southern gates.²⁴ Ptolemy 1 commissioned the construction of palaces and other significant landmarks including the Library of Alexandria and the burial place of Alexander. Beautiful buildings such as these constituted at least one-fourth of the total buildings in Alexandria.²⁵ Ptolemy 1 successfully turned plans drawn in barley into an organized, bustling city with a diverse population and a powerful economic presence.

The commercial significance of Alexandria in the third century BC was rivaled by few other cities.²⁶ Egypt had long provided highly desired products to the Hellenistic world, especially grain and papyrus.²⁷ Egyptian drugs, spices, and perfumes also spread throughout the Hellenistic world, firmly establishing Alexandria as a legitimate center of trade.²⁸ Additionally, Alexandria excelled in the production of textiles. Grain, oil, and papyri were also significant local industries.²⁹ Alexandrian trade with other parts of the Mediterranean centered around many of these exports. Indeed, the island of Rhodes drew most of its revenue from trade with Egypt largely through Alexandria.³⁰ Often, groups of

¹⁹ Ibid., 42.

²⁰ Fraser, 51.

²¹ Clarie, 28.

²² Ibid., 29.

²³ Strabo, 17.34.

²⁴ Clarie, 29.

²⁵ Strabo, 17.35.

²⁶ Diodorus, *The Library of History*, trans. by C. Bradford Welles. Loeb Classical Library Online 8, 1975, book 17, 52.5. Although most primary sources highlighting the economic importance of Alexandria appear near the turn of the century, the assumption that the city was filling this role 200 years earlier is not unfounded, according to Fraser, (133). In accordance with this, Strabo, near the turn of the century, notes that Alexandrian ports noticeably busy, even to the common man (Strabo, 17.31).

²⁷ Fraser, 133.

²⁸ Ibid., 133.

²⁹ Fraser, 138, 148.

³⁰ Williams, 26.

Alexandrian citizens established a garrison on the oft-frequented islands as a means of solidifying the connection between trading partners.³¹

During the rule of Ptolemy I, Alexandria also traded with Carthage and portions of the Italian peninsula.³² The significant number of ships in the Alexandrian fleet — 4000 in the navy and over 250 exclusively for commercial purposes by 246 BC — facilitated the booming maritime trade of the city.³³ Foreign merchant ships, ready to be unloaded and reloaded, waited for extended periods of time in the bustling ports of Alexandria, occasionally even multiple days at a time.³⁴ Alexandria's maritime economy was significant enough for a third-century depiction of the city to be represented by a woman wearing a ship hat.³⁵

Although the international trade of Alexandria flourished, commercial pursuits within Egypt outperformed even the most lucrative endeavors across the Mediterranean³⁶ Lake Mareotis, directly south of the city, provided access to the Nile and the heart of Egypt through numerous canals.³⁷ Alexandrian trade within Egypt consisted primarily of the import of grain, wheat, and barley but included other products such as honey and linens.³⁸ Imports of vegetable oil and olive oil, both local and from Syria, also played significant roles in the internal trade of Alexandria.³⁹ Alexandrian trade with the Upper Nile region centered primarily around wine, cheese, and nuts, each distinctly profitable.⁴⁰ Ptolemy I, the architect of the flourishing Alexandrian economy, also capitalized on the influx of wealth into his city with a complex and comprehensive tax system.

By 258 BC, Ptolemy I had developed a customs system that included over 200 taxes for various products.⁴¹ Alexander's successor organized his taxes into two categories: those on the *chora*, internal tariffs on Alexandrian products and those levied against imported and exported products, both within Egypt and across the Mediterranean.⁴² As a result of the ancient concepts of property ownership in Egypt, the king was considered the ultimate owner of all

³¹ Fraser, 57.

³² *Ibid.*, 152, 154.

³³ Williams, 56, 52.

³⁴ Clarie, 12.

³⁵ Williams, 41.

³⁶ Strabo, 17.31

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 17.31

³⁸ Fraser, 147, 148.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 148.

⁴⁰ Williams, 45.

⁴¹ Williams, 45.

⁴² Fraser, 134, 150.

property under his rule. Thus, Ptolemy I refrained from imposing harsh tax rates on local industry.⁴³ Local products such as papyrus, salt, dyes, leather, glass, pottery, some oil, metal workings, and bone-carvings circulated within Alexandria with minimal charges.⁴⁴ Products exported from and imported into Alexandria drew much larger taxes.⁴⁵

On imported and exported goods Ptolemy I demanded incredible payments from merchants at rates higher than anywhere else in the world.⁴⁶ An “internal” tax was levied against anything that traveled across the boundary of Upper and Middle Egypt also at extravagant rates.⁴⁷ “External” taxes were also extracted at various points on the Egyptian border, again drawing astonishing income as a result of the high tax rates.⁴⁸ Simple food items such as vegetable oil from Syria drew tax rates of fifty percent on their way into Egypt.⁴⁹ Additionally, these merchants were often taxed more than once in the process of declaring, selling, and reloading goods.⁵⁰

The revenue generated from these huge taxes contributed to the significant coffers of the Ptolemies. Uniquely Alexandrian coins began to circulate throughout the ancient world as a result of the development of a coinage and banking system.⁵¹ Ptolemy I also invested in the infrastructure of Alexandria by improving irrigation systems and promoting agricultural development around the city.⁵² Additionally, Ptolemy commissioned work on the harbors of Alexandria.

By the third century BC Alexandrian ports bustled with activity which firmly established the city as a booming economic center and a trading hub for the entire Mediterranean. Ships from across the ancient world carried out nearly all of this commercial activity, visiting the Alexandrian harbors with regularity. Thanks to Alexander’s choice location the harbors were suited to accommodate such consistent and heavy traffic, especially in regard to the depth of the bay. Many harbors around Alexandria gradually became shallower as time passed. This process was a result of the proximity of these bays to the westernmost

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 134.

⁴⁴ Williams, 50.

⁴⁵ Fraser, 143.

⁴⁶ Williams, 46.

⁴⁷ Fraser, 149.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁴⁹ Williams, 45.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁵² Williams, 49.

mouth of the Nile; the silt released from the Nile eventually filled up the natural bays along the coast.⁵³ The harbors at Alexandria, however, were protected from this gradual shallowing by the natural curvature of the bay and the island of Pharos.⁵⁴ A long, thin strip of land, the island of Pharos stretched parallel to the coast.⁵⁵ The concave coastline that formed the Alexandrian bay “thrusts two promontories into the open sea...”⁵⁶ The island of Pharos sat between these two thrusts of land, leaving enough room in-between for passage of ships but nevertheless effectively capping the Alexandrian bay. This protected the bay from the incoming weather of the Mediterranean and also prevented the silt produced by the Nile from washing into the bay.⁵⁷ Thus, the Alexandrian bay was deeper than most, rendering it more conducive to holding merchant ships with deep hulls designed for traversing the treacherous Mediterranean Sea.

In an effort to increase the efficiency of his maritime trade, Ptolemy 1 also commissioned the construction of the Heptastadion: an embankment that linked the mainland to the island of Pharos.⁵⁸ Stretching 4270 feet, the Heptastadion also contained an aqueduct and functioned as the only connection from the island to the mainland.⁵⁹ The embankment bisected the bay, splitting it into two harbors,⁶⁰ which served to combat the weather patterns of Alexandria — summer winds blew from West to North and winter winds blew from North to East.⁶¹ The large embankment served as a buffer against these seasonal winds. As a result of these weather patterns the eastern port, protected during the summer months, became known as the “Great Harbour.”⁶² Deep enough to moor any ship, the Great Harbour, around which were located the palaces and emporiums of Ptolemy 1, also displayed the magnificence of the city that Ptolemy had built. The western harbor, named Eunestos after one of Ptolemy’s relatives, saw less traffic but still functioned as a central element in the maritime trade of the city.⁶³ In order to allow access between harbors the extreme ends of the Heptastadion were bridged which provided an avenue for ships to transfer

⁵³ Williams, 55.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁵⁵ Strabo, 17.25.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.25.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 17.25.

⁵⁸ Williams, 55.

⁵⁹ Clarie, 11.

⁶⁰ Strabo, 17.26.

⁶¹ Williams, 56.

⁶² P.M. Fraser, “The ΔΙΟΛΚΟΣ of Alexandria” *The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 47 (December, 1961), 137.

⁶³ Clarie, 12.

from one harbor to the other.⁶⁴ Ptolemy I commissioned the Heptastadion as a means of improving the availability and safety of his harbor. He also accomplished this by placing the famous lighthouse on the island of Pharos.

A functional external border for the bay, the island of Pharos stretched between the deep lagoon that formed Alexandria's harbors and the Mediterranean Sea. Ptolemy I worked to improve the safety of his harbors but he could only influence the natural geography to a limited degree. Rocks littered the entrance to the Great Harbor, both visible and those hidden below the surface of the choppy water.⁶⁵ The island of Pharos was surrounded by reefs and shallows which increased the difficulty for ships to enter and exit the harbors.⁶⁶ Ptolemy I remained set on improving the economic potential of the city and continuing Alexander's dream of making Alexandria a center of Hellenistic culture. He concluded that the most effective way to reach his goals would be the construction of an unprecedented structure: a lighthouse that would both guide ships safely to the harbors of Alexandria and indicate the cultural significance of the city.⁶⁷

Ptolemy I fully grasped the incredible significance of this project, evidenced in the man that he selected to design and oversee the construction of the lighthouse: Sostratos of Knidos, the son of Dexiphanes.⁶⁸ Already well-established in the political world of the Mediterranean by his mission to Athens in 287 BC, Sostratos received numerous awards and was honored across the

⁶⁴ Strabo, 17.26.

⁶⁵ Strabo, 17.25.

⁶⁶ Clarie, 8.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁶⁸ Alexander Meeus, "The Career of Sostratos of Knidos: Politics, Diplomacy, and the Alexandrian Building Programme in the Early Hellenistic Period" in *Greece, Macedonia and Persia: Studies in Social, Political and Military History in Honour of Waldemar Heckel* ed. by Timothy Howe, E. Edward Garvin, and Graham Wrightson, 143-171 (Oxford, UK: Oxbow Books, 2015), 143. Meeus engages in a robust debate with other authors in his defense of Sostratos as the architect, including P.M. Fraser and other experts. Meeus' argument centers around the necessity of using what the existing primary sources provide. Fraser's argument requires the disregard of Sostratos' motivation in his somewhat manipulative inscription on the side of the Pharos, a step that Meeus is unwilling to take without evidence from primary sources. Also, Fraser and other experts claim the lack of primary sources before Pliny (23 AD - 79 AD) as grounds for disregarding the primary accounts that submit Sostratos as the architect. Meeus rejects this theory because of the logical implications of disregarding primary sources that span centuries from their topic — the consistent application of such rejection would be devastating to historical study in any subject. Meeus concludes that the lack of concrete evidence does not discount the available evidence provided by the primary sources and that Sostratos should be considered the architect as a result.

Mediterranean for his role in diplomatic relations between states.⁶⁹ The frequency, quality, and widespread nature of these awards indicate that Sostratos was a well-respected and widely known diplomat in the service of the Ptolemies.

Sostratos' career, however, did not start in politics. Rather, his beginnings were in engineering. Sostratos' father Dexiphanes served as chief aide to Dinocrates, one of Alexander the Great's chief designers.⁷⁰

Additionally, Dexiphanes assisted in the technical work and construction of the Heptastadion.⁷¹ Thus, Sostratos was certainly exposed to construction and architecture from a young age. With this experience, he entered the service of the Ptolemies in the late fourth century BC.⁷² His experience had immediate effect as he won the siege of Memphis for Ptolemy I by diverting the Nile.⁷³ Sostratos' fame as an engineer and architect was also influenced by his role in the construction of the Stoa of Sostratos on Knidos, a popular tourist destination in the ancient world.⁷⁴ Thus, Sostratos' political career was propelled by his well-respected work and consistent service as an engineer and architect under the Ptolemies.⁷⁵ As a result of his good standing and architectural experience, Sostratos was a natural choice to guide the construction of Alexandria's crowning jewel.

Ptolemy's goal in commissioning the construction of the lighthouse of Pharos was two-fold: to improve access to Alexandria for economic purposes and to symbolically indicate the leadership of the city in the ancient world.⁷⁶ Well-traveled as a result of his campaigns with Alexander, Ptolemy had seen other magnificent structures such as the Pyra of Haphaestion, the Colossus of Rhodes, and the Artemisium at Ephesus.⁷⁷ He also maintained a fondness for Babylonian architectural style — his palace in Alexandria centered around royal gardens, a Babylonian tradition.⁷⁸ Thus, the importance of this monument to Ptolemy cannot be understated.

Ptolemy intentionally selected his architect; next came the workers. Most of the manual labor was fulfilled by semi-unskilled laborers, many of them

⁶⁹ Meeus, 158, 161. Meeus notes that the significance of Sostratos' mission to Athens in 287 indicates that he was a seasoned diplomat by this date.

⁷⁰ Clarie, 48.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁷² Meeus, 165.

⁷³ Lucian, *Hippias*, trans. A.M. Harmon, Attalus, 2014, 2.

⁷⁴ Meeus, 147.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 165.

⁷⁶ Charles Walker, *Wonders of the Ancient World* (Gallery Books, 1989), 16.

⁷⁷ Clarie, 40.

⁷⁸ Clarie, 40.

a part of the growing non-citizen population of Alexandria during the Ptolemaic period.⁷⁹ These laborers placed materials such as brick, sand, and mortar; cut stone and wood; and carried materials to the construction site.⁸⁰ Ptolemy 1 paid the wages for these laborers, in addition to paying for the collection and transportation of many of the materials needed for the construction of the lighthouse.⁸¹

Sostratos and Ptolemy 1 chose to use primarily a local limestone known as *kedan* for the construction of the lighthouse.⁸² A stone of middling hardness, *kedan* was locally accessible and a high quality material.⁸³ Ptolemy also imported beautiful reddish-purple Aswan granite with which to construct statues around the Pharos.⁸⁴

With ample workers and available resources, Sostratos turned to the actual construction of the building. One year after the turn of the third century BC Sostratos and Ptolemy broke ground on the easternmost part of the island of Pharos and the construction of one of the seven wonders of the ancient world began.⁸⁵ Sostratos selected the flattest part of the island and organized the construction of strong sea walls to stave off the invasive Mediterranean Sea.⁸⁶ On this flat area, Sostratos directed the construction of a square, masonry platform 110 meters square and seven meters high.⁸⁷ The process of laying this platform followed contemporary construction methods during the Ptolemaic period. This consisted of laying small limestone blocks — one meter by one-half a meter — in a grid and filling in a layer of mortar around and on top of the

⁷⁹ Fraser, 51.

⁸⁰ William L. McDonald, *The Architecture of the Roman Empire*, vol. 1, *An Introductory Study* (Yale University Press, 1982), 142.

⁸¹ McDonald, 142.

⁸² Clarie, 59.

⁸³ Patrick Beaver, *A History of Lighthouses*, 11.

⁸⁴ Clarie, 60.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 37. Identifying the exact beginning date of construction on the Pharos is difficult — no primary sources provide that information directly. However, a comparison of the timelines of other building projects of this magnitude point to the construction of the Pharos taking at least two decades to complete. That information matched with Posidippus' epigram (EP. 115.1) — written to celebrate the completion of the Pharos in a time contemporary with Pyrrhus (297-272 BC) — and other, later sources (Fakharani, 272) point to the earliest construction beginning around the turn of the century.

⁸⁶ Fraser, "The ΔΙΟΛΚΟΣ of Alexandria," 18.

⁸⁷ Kenneth Sutton-Jones, *Pharos: The Lighthouse Yesterday Today and Tomorrow*, Michael Russell Publishing Inc., 1985, 415. Sources vary on the exact size of this platform but most estimates hover around 110 meters squared by 7 meters high.

blocks.⁸⁸ Often, a thin layer of white plaster was applied as well, giving the appearance of marble.⁸⁹ This white-washed masonry platform would serve as the foundation for the Pharos and one that would hold the magnificent structure for centuries to come.

Upon this wide and strong platform, Sostratos directed the construction of the first level of the Pharos. Again using the limestone blocks, although much larger ones, Sostratos built a rectangular base thirty square meters on the bottom⁹⁰ and seventy-two meters high.⁹¹ Such a massive and heavy structure necessitated the implementation of unconventional methods to hold the blocks together. Sostratos showed his ingenuity again by utilizing a model that stayed contemporary for centuries following. First, the workmen drilled holes into the blocks before pouring molten tallow into the cavities. Next, the workmen plunged a heat-anchoring iron into the tallow and poured molten lead into the holes immediately afterwards. This molten lead incinerated the tallow and filled its place, forming a dry and airtight bond. After repeating the process on another block the two would be fused together.⁹² This method allowed the construction of such a colossal structure with the limited technology of that time period.

Sostratus, in his design of the second level of the Pharos, paid homage to a key principle in classical Hellenistic architecture. He designed the second layer as an octagon, seventeen meters across and 35 meters high.⁹³ Although there were numerous characteristics of Greek architecture during this time, the concept of axiality was a pillar of Hellenistic construction and one that Sostratos included in his design of the second layer. Axiality refers to an imaginary line that divides a structure into symmetrical parts, which was evident in the Pharos.⁹⁴ Although constructing a lighthouse on Egyptian soil, Sostratos never failed to honor and promote Hellenistic culture in his architectural masterpiece.

⁸⁸ Fawzi El Fakharani, "The Lighthouse' of Abusir in Egypt" *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 78 (1974), 269.

⁸⁹ Fakharani, 269.

⁹⁰ Walker, 17.

⁹¹ Fakharani, 415. Although the details of size differ slightly, nearly every account concludes that the first layer of the Pharos was in the form of a rectangle standing on one end.

⁹² Beaver, 30.

⁹³ Sutton-Jones, 415.

⁹⁴ W.H. Davenport Adams, *Temples, Tombs, and Monuments of Ancient Greece and Rome: A description and a history of some of the most remarkable memorials of classical architecture* (London: T. Nelson and Sons, 1871), 214.

The third and final level of the Pharos also maintained the axiality of the structure; Sostratos designed it as a cylinder. This final level reached twenty-six meters high and spanned nine meters in diameter. The height of the cylinder roughly completed a 2.5:1.5:1 relationship between the respective heights of each level, a ratio that began to be represented in ancient Alexandrian coins.⁹⁵ Additionally, this final level of the Pharos contained the fire and mirrors, critical to make the Pharos a lighthouse and not simply a fantastic structure guarding the entrance to Alexandria's harbors. The constant fire that marked Alexandria's location for weary travelers blazed within a basin or lantern. This lantern, twenty feet in diameter and ten feet deep, hung from stone arches tiled with basalt, chosen for its flame-resistant qualities.⁹⁶ Although large, the fire atop the Pharos could never have been large enough on its own to be seen as far as twenty-nine miles out to sea.⁹⁷ The mirrors assisted in sending the light out into the Mediterranean. This was accomplished by the reflections of both sunlight and firelight off of a large, concave, bronze mirror positioned in the center of the cylindrical shaft. Light reflected off this horizontally-positioned mirror up to another bronze, eight-sided, pyramidal mirror, which reflected the light out from the lighthouse, guiding in the ships.⁹⁸

Sostratos successfully built the lighthouse in 19 years, completing the project under Ptolemy 1 Soter's son Philadelphus in 279 BC.⁹⁹ It reached 138 meters into the sky, an astonishing height in the ancient world.¹⁰⁰ Although unprecedented in size and scale, Sostratos' architectural masterpiece was also beautiful and functional. A set of internal steps spiraled up the building, wide enough for two men to climb simultaneously.¹⁰¹ An open shaft allowed for fuel to be lifted from the ground level to just under the top. Most of the second, octagonal layer was designed for storage. Indeed, Sostratos designed the Pharos with varying numbers of rooms at different access points inside the

⁹⁵ Clarie, 58.

⁹⁶ Clarie, 67

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 51.

⁹⁸ Clarie, 71.

⁹⁹ Fakharani, 272. Again, exact dating is difficult for the completion of the Pharos. Nevertheless, most sources converge around 280 BC.

¹⁰⁰ Walker, 17. As with nearly every other exact measurement or date regarding the Pharos, historians contest each figure, some citing outrageous heights as great as 400 meters. Nevertheless, the general consensus of reliable sources centers around 138 meters high.

¹⁰¹ Doris Behrens-Abouseif, "The Islamic History of the Lighthouse of Alexandria" *Muqarnas* 23 (2006), 3.

lighthouse.¹⁰² The exterior of the Pharos also contained a shaft running all the way to the top of the structure and operated by a rope and windlass.¹⁰³ Additionally, something of note on the outside of the Pharos was the inscription by Sostratos. Located near the top of the first level on the east side of the Pharos, the fifteen-inch letters described Sostratos as the architect.¹⁰⁴ Sostratos also covered this engraved inscription with a layer of plaster, hiding the fact that he promoted his own name above that of either Ptolemy.

Sostratos also included less functional elements in the Pharos. Artists sculpted the red-purple granite into statues to decorate the area around the lighthouse. The main entrance door, situated nearly twenty-five feet above the water, had a high, arched doorframe and ramp leading into the lighthouse.¹⁰⁵ The Pharos also contained four bronze tritons. These were aesthetically pleasing but also served a purpose unrelated to economics: one would be blown to alert of enemy approach and one was blown every hour as a method of keeping time.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, the Pharos sat over a cistern of clean water, brought to the island through the aqueduct of the Heptastadion. Supporting this cistern sat four glass and bronze crabs, so large that a man could sit between the claws.¹⁰⁷

A final artistic addition to the Pharos was the statue that rested at the very top of the structure. This statue represented Isis, the goddess who invented sails and was widely considered the protector of ships.¹⁰⁸ The naked and beardless figure held a small object in one hand and a rowing oar in the other.¹⁰⁹ Isis' posture was one of action and progression to declare from the highest point in Alexandria that the city was a thriving and growing metropolis. Such extravagance indicated Sostratos' pride in his work and was reflected in the bill

¹⁰² Behrens-Abouseif, 6. Scholars debate the exact number of rooms still today — the most reliable sources are Arabic writers from 1100 AD, most likely writing after the initial destruction and reconstruction of the lighthouse. Estimates for the original numbers vary between fifty and 300.

¹⁰³ Clarie, 61.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 45.

¹⁰⁵ Clarie, 60.

¹⁰⁶ Clarie, 65.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 63.

¹⁰⁸ Susan Handler, "Architecture on the Roman Coins of Alexandria," *American Journal of Archaeology* 75 no. 1 (January, 1971), 75. Again, historians cannot agree on the original subject of Sostratos' statue. Without conclusive evidence, historians are left to lean on ancient coins, the fact that a cult center or temple seemed to also be situated on the island of Pharos (Fraser, 20), and the recent discovery of a very large statue of Isis in the harbor of Alexandria.


¹⁰⁹ Handler, 75.

— the total construction cost of the Pharos reached over 800 talents of silver, equivalent to the weight of 800 men.¹¹⁰

In under two decades, Sostratos oversaw the building of a structure unprecedented in design, size, and function. The colossal height and unique layers of the Pharos set it apart from contemporary structures. Although earlier lighthouses may have existed, none reached the international fame and served as a model for countless others like the Pharos.¹¹¹ Sostratos' experience as both an architect and a diplomat uniquely prepared him to direct such a significant project. Indeed, Sostratos' employer, Ptolemy 1 Soter, recognized in him the characteristics of a man who would build a lighthouse that continued the vision established by Alexander the Great, a vision of a city both flourishing economically and leading the ancient world in scholarship and art.

¹¹⁰ Pliny, *Natural History*, 36.17.

¹¹¹ Sutton-Jones, 3.



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WINDOWS TO THE DIVINE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF BYZANTINE ART

By Sam Klein

Byzantine art, at times belittled and overlooked by critics, is now better understood within the mindset and motivations that produced it. Judged in terms of realism such as accurate bodily proportions, precise detail, or subtle and complex color, Byzantine style indeed lacks much. Its goals were elsewhere.¹ While the classical mind and its echo in the Italian Renaissance strove to depict the world as it was, if not more vibrant, the Byzantine eye looked beyond the world. Its scenes were not “representations but reenactments.”² Its abstractions were not failures to capture reality, but conscious efforts to reflect a higher reality beyond mere sensation and emotion.³ The nonrepresentational nature of Byzantine art, while not universally acknowledged, has been widely observed and is essential to framing its history.

Byzantine style first emerged as the Christening of Hellenic styles. Later challenged by iconoclasm, Byzantine style then progressed towards unity and formalized patterns. Finally, as other aspects of empire faded, Byzantine style found a second wind as it scattered through the Balkans and Eurasia. As such, the diversity of Byzantine art narrowed at its apex of formal style and then scattered and expanded in its twilight. And yet, though marked by distinct stages, a focus on unified expression allowed for remarkable consistency of theme even when style and subject matter changed.

Byzantine art was born out of efforts to recapture and christen the highpoints of Hellenic style, for unlike Western Europe, Byzantium enjoyed an unbroken link with its Greco-Roman past.⁴ As part of this, respect for the classical tradition’s mathematical approach to beauty was held in high esteem. From this focus on symmetry and balance Byzantine art acquired its characteristic rigidity and emotional coolness. In addition, the always present Platonism of Byzantine thought came out in the careful attention given to optic

¹ Antoine Bon, *Byzantium*, trans. James Hogarth (Geneva: Nagel Publishers, 1972), 189-190.

² Gervase Mathew, *Byzantine Aesthetics* (New York, NY: Viking Press, 1964), 1.

³ Antoine Bon, *Byzantium*, trans. James Hogarth (Geneva: Nagel Publishers, 1972), 190.

⁴ Gervase Mathew, *Byzantine Aesthetics* (New York, NY: Viking Press, 1964), 2.

stylings such as forced perspective and lighting.⁵ But most importantly Byzantine art sought to link the visible beauty of the physical with the unseen beauty of the sublime.⁶ It was in the striving for this connection that Byzantine art made its first break from the classical works that nurtured it.

Soon after Theodosius I made Christianity compulsory, an explosion of Christian depictions emerged as vast amounts of pagan artistic energy then shifted to raising and decorating Christian churches. By the 5th century, clear stylistic shifts came to accompany this change in subject. Plant and scenic elements were simplified and abstracted. The human image became the center. Seen from afar as worshippers entered high vaulted churches, Christian figures stood in strong simple colors with dark outlines, directly facing the worshipper. Meticulously rendered with precious stones and gold, these figures represented both the culmination of venerable Greek styles and their transformation into a new form that would last until the empire's fall.⁷

The Baptistery of the orthodoxy in Ravenna offers a fine example of all these elements (see Figure 1). Christ and John the Baptist stand in the center of the dome in a strict frontal perspective. Apostles radiate around him in a strict hierarchy.

Alongside church decoration, icon production also enjoyed its first flowering under Theodosius I. According to Byzantine Scholar Thomas F. Mathews, the icon itself is the purest example of Byzantine art and its sensibilities.⁸ Like their mosaic counterpart, Byzantine icons represented an admiring but drastic transformation of classical styles. The development of the Christian icon traces back to about 200 A.D. when Hellenistic mystery cults began producing simple almost abstract paintings of spiritual figures for personal and commercial use. These pagan proto-icons were popular well up into the advent of Christianity in the East and strongly influenced developing Christian techniques. An example of this can be seen in the fact that both pagan and Christian icons shared the same strict frontal perspective. Additionally, the small almost portable format of these cult works strongly influenced the physical dimensions and intimate context of later Christian icons.⁹

⁵ Mathew, 1.

⁶ Ibid, 6.

⁷ Roger Ling, *Ancient Mosaics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 109-110.

⁸ Thomas F. Mathews, *Byzantium: From Antiquity to the Renaissance* (New York, NY: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1998), 46.

⁹ Ibid, 43.

Around the 6th century, the abstract style of early Christian icons began to merge with a parallel tradition of secular Roman portraiture.¹⁰ This synthesis was critical because it represented a shift in mindset as well as style. The Greek mystery icons never attempted to depict the gods as they actually were but instead rendered them as men, as substitutes for the gods' incorporeal forms. However, under the secondary influence of Roman portraiture, Byzantine icons worked to depict the reality of their divine subjects. In this way, Christian icons sought to separate themselves from pagan tradition through the claim that the human forms of Christ and the saints could be physically depicted.¹¹ However the physical accuracy of such portrait attempts was debatable. As iconography progressed, the specific gave way to the archetypal, and these archetypes often combined pagan and Christian imagery. The beard, long hair, and wide forehead of the quintessential Christ figure of Byzantine art were all in actuality pagan tropes from earlier depictions of Zeus.¹² Another challenge to the identity of Christian icons, came from the potential emotional trapping present in portraits, such as an illusory relationship between image and onlooker. While a spiritual connection was always the goal, icons often became the center of personal emotions of affection and longing that blurred the line between Christ the idea and the icon as Christ himself.¹³ This would become the central problem of the icon controversies to come that would later be solved by an increased formalizing of the rules of depiction and a stark downplaying of emotional content.

After the highpoints of the 6th and 7th century, Byzantine art fell prey to intense civil turmoil that culminated in a backlash against icons that lasted from 716-843 A.D.¹⁴ Beginning in earnest with Emperor Leo III, icons were banned and those who were sympathetic to them were brutally persecuted. This happened in part because early icons had very weak theological justifications. The best defenses mustered at first were usually along the lines that unschooled common people needed physical objects to understand the divine. Their opponents quickly countered that this concern was already better addressed by the Eucharist and the established liturgy of the Orthodox church.¹⁵ It soon became clear that it would take an argument outside of this stalemate to provide

¹⁰ Mathews, 48.

¹¹ Ibid., 50.

¹² Ibid., 51.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Antoine Bon, *Byzantium*, trans. James Hogarth (Geneva: Nagel Publishers, 1972), 21.

¹⁵ Mathews., 55.

an adequate justification. Such an argument was eventually found in Neo-Platonism, a staple of Byzantine thought. Removed from the turmoil by writing abroad in the 8th century, St. John of Damascus formulated one of the first and best Platonic arguments for icons.

His reasoning had two main points: all physical emblems of the liturgy were alike images,¹⁶ and the incarnation allowed man to perfectly perceive the image of God.¹⁷ The first point was mostly rhetorical and redefined “image” as any physical thing used to help one comprehend or worship of God. John cited the many artifacts of the Jews such as the Ark of the Covenant and the tabernacle as examples. He also claimed their legitimacy came from the fact that they were patterned after heavenly forms in this case the ones shown to Moses on Mt. Sinai.¹⁸ John’s second point was subtler and argued that the banning of icons on the basis that the physical could not depict the spiritual ended up denying the incarnation. If Christ truly came in the flesh, into the world of the five senses, then he could be legitimately portrayed through the five physical senses. He combined these points to show that icons were in the same category as the ark and the Eucharist for they were patterned after heavenly forms and had special power because they recalled the physical appearance and therefore the reality of God becoming a man.¹⁹

By the 9th century these Platonic justifications for icons began to affect the style of Byzantine art in every context. Works became less and less individually distinct as artists endeavored to submit to and match official forms.²⁰ Together, this host of unified images created a consistent and recognizable matrix that linked Orthodox worshippers from all corners of the empire to the same spiritual world. Likewise, these new images held no intention of stirring individual emotion.²¹ Instead, universal images spoke to the universal soul, and every image served as iterations of a singular expressive whole.²²

¹⁶ St. John of Damascus, *On the Holy Images*, trans. Mary H. Allies (London: Thomas Bakers, 1898) Accessed October 6, 2016. Internet Medieval Sourcebook.

¹⁷ St. John of Damascus, *The Fount of Wisdom*, trans. S.D.F. Salmon in *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* (Grand Rapids Mi: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1955) Accessed October 6, 2016, Internet Medieval Sourcebook.

¹⁸ St. John of Damascus, *On the Holy Images*.

¹⁹ St. John of Damascus, *The Fount of Wisdom*.

²⁰ Otto Demus, *Byzantine Mosaic Decoration: Aspects of Monumental Art in Byzantium* (Boston, MA: Boston Books and Art Shop. 1955), 3.

²¹ Demus, 4-5.

²² Ibid, 3-4.

In all this, the goal of the first stage, the union of the physical and divine, carried over. As Otto Demus points out, one of the central strengths of John's argument was that it answered the criticism that icons split Christ from his divinity. For if those who beheld Christ face to face experienced both God and man through physical senses, then a physical icon could capture both Christ's divinity and humanity. So it also followed that, just as Christ reflected the image of God, icons of Christ could reflect God himself.²³ However, to do so, icons had to follow rigid guidelines to, as believed, effectively mirror their source subjects.²⁴

These guidelines often centered around line of sight. The icon had to be centered down a completely frontal perspective. The form had to be symmetrical and its details in accordance with the archetype portrayed. The eyes looked straight out to meet the onlooker, and, if placed correctly, brought the worshipper face to face with the divine.²⁵ These conventions brought great restrictions to pose and motion, and yet creative solutions were found. For instance, to show the interaction of two images, faces were carefully turned to maintain $\frac{3}{4}$ eye contact with the onlooker. So long as both eyes were visible communion was still possible. But if $\frac{1}{2}$ or more of the face was obscured, as was the case with many evil figures, the spiritual connection was lost.²⁶ These new norms reset the standards for what it looked like for figures to face each other, allowing even slight changes in posture to stand out dramatically.²⁷ A prototype of this effect can be seen in the earlier mentioned baptistery dome where two apostles beneath Jesus and John turn ever so slightly to interact with one another. Another convention required that important figures be spatially isolated, but this also often obscured relational action between figures. To mitigate this problem, figures were often placed on curved surfaces and gestures were exaggerated.²⁸

The final stage of Byzantine art came about during the gradual decline of the empire starting in the late 12th century to the eventual fall of Constantinople to Ottoman Turks in 1453. However, Byzantine tradition was unique in that its artistic production maintained its original quality even as other

²³ Demus, 6.

²⁴ Ibid., 7.

²⁵ Ibid..

²⁶ Ibid., 6.

²⁷ Ibid., 8.

²⁸ Ibid., 9.

elements of empire decayed.²⁹ This time of surprising cultural resilience is often called the Pelaeologue Renaissance.³⁰

As political and military pressure grew along her eastern borders, pockets of Byzantine culture moved to more stable centers, usually monastic, on the Black Sea, in the Balkans³¹ and in southeastern Greece.³² At the same time, Byzantine influence even spread into Bulgaria and other Slavic regions.³³ Yet, despite this great geographic range, the ever important unity of theme within Byzantine style held out.³⁴ However, the economic pressures of the time did call for a change in medium. As the materials for mosaics became prohibitively expensive for most small monasteries, painting became the default form of expression.³⁵ Additionally, the cast of religious figures seemed to have expanded at this time even as the rules of depictions remained the same. Even the Macedonian school which seemed to have departed from the mold by depicting figures with slightly more movement and emotion did not ultimately depart from the formal Platonic goals shared by every region. As art historian Antoine Bon argued, the variances of the Macedonian school were neither political nor intentional, and similar trends could also be seen as far away as Crete.³⁶ If anything, artists in both places had finally perfected the formal compromises of motion and perspective without straying from their original Platonic aims.

With the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Byzantine culture in the technical sense was extinguished. However, its influence long lingered in the regions touched by its influence. Because of this, it is somewhat difficult to pinpoint the exact end of Byzantine tradition. It lived on wherever a conscious choice was made to portray the archetypical as the actual in order to create a window to the Divine. It ended whenever and wherever these goals were abandoned or made impossible.

Throughout its course of influence, Byzantine style succeeded in bringing innovative and complex theological expression to visual art by transcending its pagan models. However, it would not have lasted if not for its finely tuned formalities. It survived civil turmoil precisely because it attained an

²⁹ Antoine Bon, *Byzantium*, trans. James Hogarth (Geneva: Nagel Publishers, 1972), 24.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 135.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 24.

³² *Ibid.*, 164.

³³ *Ibid.*, 137.


³⁴ *Ibid.*, 139.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 162.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 168.

ever more perfect uniformity of theme. Finally, never seeking liberation from convention, it instead embraced these restraints, and in doing so freed itself to expand into and influence a vast space. Only from this perspective do the unreal, rigid, and formal development of Byzantine art makes sense, for it was those very qualities that produced its paradoxical combination of stability and dynamism.

RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS OF THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD



Articles

Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt and Martin Luther: It's Complicated
by Stryder Matthews

*The Political Consequences of King Charles II's Catholic Sympathies in
Restoration England*
by Nathan C. Harkey



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ANDREAS BODENSTEIN VON KARLSTADT AND MARTIN LUTHER: IT'S COMPLICATED

By Stryder Matthews

The Reformation was undoubtedly a period of great tumult. It was more surprising when two individuals, who were so closely connected, who seemed to have had similar theological backgrounds and were in fact allies from the start fought in a grand and vehement manner. Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt and Martin Luther were these such men. The divide between these two was primarily a result of Luther's consistent misunderstanding of Karlstadt and his conservative shift upon his return to Wittenberg in 1522. Though the men disagreed over issues such as the practice of the Eucharist, the method of salvation, the manner in which God works, and a vast number of minor points, none were primarily responsible for their divide. Rather, circumstantial and historical difficulties, particularly the German Peasant's War, combined with Luther's attempts to moderate the path of reform, were the cause of their complicated and harsh relationship.

The understanding of the Karlstadt-Luther debate forwarded in this paper stands in opposition to the contention of historian Ronald J. Sider in *Karlstadt's Battle with Luther: Documents in a Liberal-Radical Debate*. He framed Luther and Karlstadt in liberal-radical terms. He emphasized the primacy of strategic debate and attempts to amalgamate many theological disputes as being, fundamentally, strategic.¹ Embedded in this understanding of the Karlstadt-Luther relationship was that Karlstadt had to be a radical reformer while Luther was liberal. Sider did attempt to soften the strict view of Karlstadt as a radical reformer which had been present within most historiography, however, Karlstadt fell under that umbrella nonetheless. Essentially, the idea of a "Radical Reformer" was a strict dismissal of authority in favor of more absolute adherence to some given doctrine, i.e. Müntzer in his upheaval of social order for the sake of bringing about ecclesiastical change. In contrast to the radical reformer was the conservative who generally sought to enact change by means of the system in place, i.e. Erasmus who pursued improvement within the Catholic Church as opposed to outside of it. Additionally, the liberal reformer generally attempted to create change without the upheaval of a system but by altering it significantly. The liberal title fit Karlstadt who considerably changed

¹ Ronald J. Sider, "Conclusion: The Perennial Debate," in *Karlstadt's Battle with Luther*, 157.

the actions of the Church without abolishing the connection to the Catholic Church entirely. In light of this, Karlstadt was certainly liberal. In 1524, Karlstadt penned his “doctrine of change” so to speak: *Whether One Should Proceed Slowly, and Avoid Offending the Weak in Matters that Concern God’s Will*. His answer to this question was a strict “no”. This came about as a result of Luther’s attempts to moderate the many changes in Wittenberg during his absence.



Karlstadt in the 1540s

Karlstadt did, however, enact one radical reform. In line with his new theology, on January 1, 1522 Karlstadt led a mass with all partaking of the wine in addition to the bread.² Previously, the laity took only the bread while the clergy took both. He even spoke the mass in German and offered the bread and the cup to the laity themselves, letting them take hold of it in their occasionally shaky hands. Nervousness and tension mounted in this event where apparently even one man “dropped his wafer and was too terror-stricken to pick it up.”³ The sacrosanct status of the Eucharist made such a slip-up absolutely horrifying. This was nothing new, however, since as early as 1520 Luther himself had called for these exact reforms (those being the use of German and the cup being given also to the laity).⁴ Also in 1522, Karlstadt further attacked images and ordained a sort of iconoclasm. “It is good, necessary, laudable, and godly to do away with [images],”⁵ and he enforced this reform consistently within Wittenberg.

At the same time, a general unease throughout Saxony arose alongside Karlstadt’s developments, accompanied by rioting and occasional violence. Although Wittenberg was not a hotbed of such activity, Frederick the Wise considered it wise to bring Luther back.⁶ Upon Luther’s return he quickly

² Carter Lindberg, “Conflicting Models of Ministry-Luther, Karlstadt, and Muentzer,” *Concordia Theological Quarterly* 41, no. 4 (October 1977): 40.

³ Ronald J. Sider, “Karlstadt as Reformer: The Sermon for the First Evangelical Eucharist,” in *Karlstadt’s Battle with Luther*, 5-6.

⁴ Amy Nelson Burnett, *Karlstadt and the Origins of the Eucharistic Controversy: A Study in the Circulation of Ideas*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 40.

⁵ Andreas Bodenstein von Carlstadt, “On the Removal of Images,” in *The Essential Carlstadt: Fifteen Tracts*, 102.

⁶ Carter Lindberg, “Conflicting Models of Ministry-Luther, Karlstadt, and Muentzer,” 40-41.

preached eight sermons in an attempt to stem the tide of radicalism that had grown within Wittenberg. He spoke of having “patience with [our brother’s] weakness and help him bear it,”⁷ and espoused an intent to talk and reach man’s ears in these matters, but only to talk, giving “free course to the Word and not add[ing] our works to it.”⁸ He essentially sought to prod men with his words in the hope of opening their hearts to the work of God but not to force upon them certain actions, as he saw outward acts to have little prescriptive benefit. To thus act as Karlstadt had was to impede the reformation of the heart, and fail to truly pierce the core of the issue and instead push away and attempt to do what only God can do. This rebuttal displayed a crucial difference in their understanding of faith formation and showed a marked conservative shift in Luther’s path to reform, seeking change within the church as it was through conviction, not systemic change.

After 1524, there was little chance for reconciliation of these reformer’s further actions. Karlstadt unequivocally stated “each one should do what God commands, even if the whole world hesitates and does not want to follow.”⁹ He continued; “again, may I blaspheme God as long as the others do not stop blaspheming?”¹⁰ He even attacked Luther’s idea of brotherly love as justification for patience as equivalent to failing to take a knife from a child. “Their love is like the love of a crazy mother who allows her children to go their own way – and to end on the gallows.”¹¹ His opposition was consistently vehement, displaying a deep-seated conviction and fear of all that he perceived to be against God. He denied any distinction between what was required and what was good for an individual, which Luther put forward in his Eight Sermons.¹² Karlstadt saw all of these acts as absolutely necessary for the preservation of the soul. This split was deeply rooted and theologically motivated despite being technically about strategy. Even more so, Luther was shifting to a far more conservative strategy of gradual change, while Karlstadt stuck to a liberal mode of reform.

⁷ Martin Luther, “The First Sermon, March 9, 1522, Invocavit Sunday”, in “Eight Sermons at Wittenberg,” in *Karlstadt’s Battle with Luther*, 19.

⁸ Martin Luther, “The Second Sermon, March 10, 1522, Monday after Invocavit,” in “Eight Sermons at Wittenberg,” in *Karlstadt’s Battle with Luther*, 22.

⁹ Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt, “Whether One Should Proceed Slowly,” in *The Radical Reformation*, 52.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 52.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 65.

¹² Martin Luther, “The Second Sermon, March 10, 1522, Monday after Invocavit,” in “Eight Sermons at Wittenberg,” in *Karlstadt’s Battle with Luther*, 22.

A primary issue between Luther and Karlstadt was the handling of the Holy Eucharist. The Catholic position was preoccupied with the Eucharist as “the essence of stability of social order and of dominant ideology,”¹³ and was ever important which perhaps can help to explain why these discussions were so absolutely inflamed. The theology of the Catholic Eucharist essentially was transubstantiation, which ascribed to the bread and the wine the real presence of Christ. A genuine miracle occurred, and the bread and wine were literally transformed. This also entailed a result which Karlstadt, particularly, attacked. With the doctrine of transubstantiation and the ever-growing importance of this sacrament, the wine was no longer given to the laity for fear of spilling and potentially trampling upon the literal blood of Christ.¹⁴ As previously noted, Karlstadt acted quickly to begin giving the wine to the laity as well.

Karlstadt argued against the current papal position and considered it beyond repair: “In sum, everything is perverted: word, manner, work, fruit, and use of the mass.”¹⁵ He intended to scrap the custom and instead sought “the place where [the sacrament] springs from the ground.”¹⁶ What then was this source according to Karlstadt? Early on in 1521, while Luther was still in hiding after his close call at the Diet of Worms, Karlstadt enacted the first “Evangelical Eucharist.” His sermon revealed his theology and he declared “faith makes God’s Word useful,”¹⁷ affirmed “faith alone makes us holy and righteous,”¹⁸ and strongly emphasized throughout the power of the sacrament to forgive sins.¹⁹

At this time was Luther justified in his later opposition to Karlstadt? Perhaps on one point. Karlstadt did attack oral confession in a somewhat

¹³ Miri Rubin, *Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 350.

¹⁴ Miri Rubin, 70-71.

¹⁵ Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt, *The Eucharistic Pamphlets of Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt*, ed. by Amy Nelson Burnett, (Kirksville, Missouri: Truman State University Press, 2015), 51.

¹⁶ Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt, “On Both Forms in the Holy Mass, On Signs in General and What they Effect and Signify, Those Who Receive Both Forms are Not Bohemians or Heretics but Evangelical Christians,” in *The Eucharistic Pamphlets of Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt*, 51.

¹⁷ Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt, “A Sermon of Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt at Wittenberg Concerning the Reception of the Holy Sacrament,” in *Karlstadt’s Battle with Luther*, 11.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 7-15.

surprisingly vitriolic manner. "It is nothing other than the devil's trick and the Antichrist's hovel when the word of the cup does not carry as much weight with one as the invented form of a miserable priest [oral confession]." ²⁰ After Luther's return he preached on this particular point and essentially reached the conclusion that confession was far from an abominable thing. Though he would not compel any individual into it, neither would he take it from anyone. ²¹ However, this is an ancillary point as Luther never engaged Karlstadt on the question of confession though it could have reinforced Luther's disagreement with Karlstadt.

Onto this initial conception of the Eucharist, what was their point of contention? Luther's theology on this point was certifiably difficult to truly unearth but perhaps with a few major points, a workable outline can be created. For one, he emphasized the power of the Word of Institution. "Who is worthy to receive the sacrament? Those who are moved by the Word to believe the sacrament's promises." ²² In this point there did not seem to be significant differences. Worthiness as derived from understanding and belief was directly what Karlstadt discussed. His mentions of faith alone also find reverberance in Luther's own theology. "The doctrine of justification is nothing else than faith," ²³ and this doctrine of justification was the Eucharist and its use. By 1522, there was no significant and apparent difference in their actions or theology, except in Luther's growing concern over the perceived radicalism of Wittenberg.

Over time, however, divergence did begin to occur. Luther is well known for his consideration of the Eucharist as consubstantiation. He believed in the universal God, existing in all areas at all times, but considered the sacrament a time when Christ is "especially concentrated in the Eucharist," ²⁴ although the bread and wine continue to exist in tandem. Here Karlstadt had some genuine divergences from Luther. This distinction was most apparent in 1524 with his tract of the *Misuse of the Lord's Bread and Cup*. In this, Karlstadt

²⁰ "A Sermon of Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt at Wittenberg Concerning the Reception of the Holy Sacrament," 14.

²¹ Martin Luther, "The Eighth Sermon, March 16, 1522, Remiscere Sunday" in "Eight Sermons at Wittenberg," in *Karlstadt's Battle with Luther*, 34-35.

²² Thomas J. Davis, "'The Truth of Divine Words': Luther's Sermons on the Eucharist, 1521-1528, and the Structure of Eucharistic Meaning," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 30, no. 2, (Summer 1999): 327.

²³ Paul Althus, *The Theology of Martin Luther*, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress Press, 1966), 225.

²⁴ Chris Thornhill, *German Political Philosophy: The Metaphysics of Law*, (London: Routledge, 2006), 38.

distinguished the sacrament and the body of Christ as two wholly distinct elements, purporting the sacrament not as the object of salvation, but rather the vehicle of remembrance of this salvation. It was a symbolic Eucharist, one which did not save but pointed to what saves, and was in this way not the body and blood of Christ, nor was there anything spiritually imbibed in the bread and wine.²⁵ This was a clear and marked distinction between Luther and Karlstadt, and on this point their debate grew vehement. After this tract and subsequent writings on the Eucharist by Karlstadt, Luther, in 1525, penned a letter which truly showed the depth of their divide. “Doctor Andreas Karlstadt has deserted us, and on top of that has become our worst enemy.”²⁶ This rift was devastating towards their already tenuous relationship.

The Eucharistic conflict, however, was not limited to Karlstadt and Luther but appeared throughout the Reformation period as a common theme. Luther later had a “shouting match” at Marburg with Zwingli in 1529, wherein the argument was over the Eucharist as purely symbolic or still as a genuine piece of Christ’s body and blood.²⁷ This issue even brought in Martin Bucer, a contemporary Reformer, who was relatively prolific in his attempts to subdue the issue and had organized the Marburg Colloquy just mentioned. Bucer was far less concerned with the matter, saying, “leave disputing, love one another, until you become sanctified.”²⁸ The fight between transubstantiation, consubstantiation, or symbolic Eucharist in its many forms was central to the Reformation. Luther and Karlstadt existed in a much wider conflict that was a fundamental theological sticking point for many reformers and thus begat heated debate all across the Reformation.

Although Karlstadt was intensely involved in the Eucharist debate, peculiar to him was his frequent admonition of the laity and his identification with them, although in a more protective sense. He viewed himself “as the

²⁵ Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt, “Concerning the Anti-Christian Misuse of the Lord’s Bread and Cup Whether Faith in the Sacrament Forgives Sin; and Whether the Sacrament is an Arrabo or Pledge of the Forgiveness of Sin. Exegesis of the Eleventh Chapter of the First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, Concerning the Lord’s Supper,” in *Karlstadt’s Battle with Luther*, 74-91.

²⁶ Martin Luther, “Against the Heavenly Prophets in the Matter of Images and Sacraments,” in *Karlstadt’s Battle with Luther*, 94.

²⁷ B. A. Gerrish, “Discerning the Body: Sign and Reality in Luther’s Controversy with the Swiss,” *The Journal of Religion* 68, no. 3 (July 1998): 378.

²⁸ Lee Palmer Wandel, *The Eucharist in the Reformation*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 65.

shepherd, angrily and lovingly concerned for his sheep.”²⁹ Neil R. Leroux, in considering the rhetoric of Karlstadt’s Evangelical Mass described “Karlstadt’s role as the *people’s prophet*,” his turn of phrase painting him in a role which is of the people and in assistance rather than on the outside.³⁰ It was perhaps no surprise that he was considered to be in some way culpable for the Peasant Revolts. The initial indictment of this activity came from Luther himself and was a good exemplar of how their relationship played out. Luther often spoke of the “rebellious spirit” of Müntzer and Karlstadt alike which seemed to have been the primary factor leading up to the Confrontation at the Black Bear Inn. This incident occurred shortly after Luther’s Eight Sermons at Wittenberg in which Luther repeatedly indicted Karlstadt and his teachings. Soon after they agreed to meet at the Black Bear for a brief discussion in which not much was said but quite a few feelings were hurt. Thankfully, an anonymous individual took consistent notes on the event and provided a compelling account.³¹ Karlstadt began: “For today in your sermon, Mr. Doctor [Luther], you attacked me somewhat severely and you interwove me in one number and work with the riotous murdering spirits, as you call them.”³² This was a clear refusal by Karlstadt to be thought of in tandem with Müntzer and the Peasant Revolts.

Luther’s amalgamating of his many opponents in one broad stroke was not peculiar to Karlstadt, rather, it was a consistent black mark on Luther’s actions. He frequently attacked all his opponents in one motion displaying an odd sort of metaphysical assumption about them. Luther had a notion that all his opponents were under the same satanic spirit, which speaks to his belief that he was engaged in a spiritual struggle against the devil’s work. This enabled him to decry of the spirit of his opponents rather than in engaging their arguments more specifically.³³ This issue displayed prominently in his attacks on Karlstadt particularly when combining his position with the rebellious spirit of Müntzer.

Karlstadt dealt directly with the accusations of his involvement with Allstedt at length in his *Apology by Dr. Andreas Carlstadt Regarding the False*

²⁹ Peter Matheson, *Rhetoric of the Reformation* (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 67.

³⁰ Neil R. Leroux, “Karlstadt’s Christag Predig: Prophetic Rhetoric in an ‘Evangelical’ Mass,” *Church History* 72, no. 1 (March 2003): 135.

³¹ Ronald J. Sider, “Confrontation at the Black Bear,” in *Karlstadt’s Battle with Luther*, 36-37.

³² Anonymous, “What Dr. Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt Talked Over with Dr. Martin Luther at Jena, and How They Have Decided to Write against Each Other,” in *Karlstadt’s Battle with Luther: Documents in a Liberal-Radical Debate*, 40.

³³ Mark U. Edwards, *Luther and the False Brethren*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), 58-59.

Charge of Insurrection which has Unjustly Been Made against Him; Allstedt having been the town in which Thomas Müntzer's peasant uprisings began which so disconcerted Luther and many other reformers. He had been "accused of the uprising in Allstedt and of several others, as if [he] had been the leader and captain of the rebellious peasants."³⁴ Within this he explained the circumstances of his life during these revolts and attempted to prove his innocence. He also discussed his revilement at Müntzer. "How I cursed Müntzer's folly and made known what disaster would come of it ... and that the gospel would suffer irreparable damage ...!"³⁵ He decried Müntzer on all accounts, considering his work a folly, although not without a little grief having preferred to say nothing ill towards a brother. This assessment could, however, be colored by Karlstadt having been at Luther's mercy at this point, the apology being written in 1525.

Turning back a brief moment in time to 1524, Karlstadt wrote a letter to Allstedt, Müntzer's center of unrest, rebuking his attempts to forge some sort of alliance on behalf of the congregation of Orlamünde. Within it, Karlstadt explicitly states "we cannot help you with armed resistance,"³⁶ dismissing any attempts to forge some sort of violent pact. Karlstadt demonstrates, despite his frequent iconoclasm and disdain of moving slowly, it was not to be done through armed resistance. He cited Jesus' command to Peter to sheath his sword (Matthew 26:52), and insisted the people of Allstedt seek not to fight with arms but with faith, prayer, and deference to God and find defense through those means.³⁷

This absolute resistance to extreme methods of religious change demonstrated the strength of Karlstadt's will in opposing highly radical paths of reformation. Luther was undoubtedly mistaken in his ascribing a rebellious spirit to Karlstadt, much more so in having believed he was in some way complicit in Müntzer's rebellion. Their disputes were often obfuscated by the tumult of the day. However, it does not follow that the confusion of the day completely undermined Karlstadt and Luther's mutual understanding. These men had

³⁴ Andreas Bodenstein von Carlstadt, "Apology by Dr. Andreas Carlstadt Regarding the False Charge of Insurrection Which Has Unjustly Been Made Against Him," in *The Essential Carlstadt: Fifteen Tracts*, 379.

³⁵Ibid, 380.

³⁶ Andreas Bodenstein von Carlstadt, "Letter from the Community in Orlamünde to the People of Allstedt," in *The Radical Reformation*, ed. by Michael G. Baylor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 33.

³⁷ Andreas Bodenstein von Carlstadt, "Letter from the Community in Orlamünde to the People of Allstedt," in *The Radical Reformation*, 33-34.

known each other well and were familiar with each other's theologies. If anything, Luther's misunderstanding of Karlstadt's position among radicals betrays his failure to fully understand his strategy. If Luther could not ascertain why it would be inconsistent for Karlstadt to support the Peasant Revolts, and it certainly would have been, strategy could not have been central to their debate. It was only central insofar as Luther misunderstood Karlstadt.

The final question arises yet again: over what did these two relatively similar reformers oppose each other? Ultimately, it was less about the *what* and more about the *why*. The various issues Karlstadt and Luther disagreed on were relatively minimal and, barring the Eucharist, were far more similar than opposed. The largest issue at hand was Luther's conservative shift upon his return to Wittenberg. Further than that, however, was an issue which Richard A. Beinert described as a "mutual rejection of each other's views concerning the process of faith formation," as he emphasized their understanding of their reform in the context of shaping the "basic pattern of Christian spirituality."³⁸ Thus, they disagreed on their basic conception of what reform ought to mean in practice. Beyond this, however, was the broader issue of Luther fundamentally misunderstanding Karlstadt's relationship with the German Peasant's War. As such, the relationship between Luther and Karlstadt can only be characterized as complicated. It was two men within a whirlwind of change, doubt, and concern over the very salvation of man's soul mixed with fear of the Catholic Church and the radicalized peasantry.

³⁸ Richard A. Beinert, "Another Look at Luther's Battle with Karlstadt," *Concordia Theological Quarterly* 73, no. 2 (April 2009): 170.



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THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF KING CHARLES II'S CATHOLIC SYMPATHIES IN RESTORATION ENGLAND

By Nathan Harkey

Religion now will serve no more
To cloak our false professors;
There's none so blinde but plainly sees
Who were the Lands Oppressors.
– a pre-Restoration Royalist Propaganda
rhyme¹

In 1660, after spending over a decade in exile, Charles Stuart was invited back to the throne of England by a parliament that was filled with recently elected Royalists. He had spent his exile on mainland Europe, appealing to various other Royal powers to help him take back his kingdom. Fortunately for Charles, he was welcomed back by his people, who had for the most part suffered under a bland and morally strict regime following the execution of his father, Charles I. While Oliver Cromwell was alive, his power went virtually unquestioned, but his Puritan Commonwealth struggled to make an agreeable constitution that would replace the monarchy.

English men and women have long viewed the monarchy as a symbol of which they could be proud. When Cromwell died, his son Richard left much to be desired as an inspiring leader, as instability and confusion intensified during his short tenure.² Therefore, the people of England must have felt some sort of optimism for a revival of the monarchy, hoping that the new king would be able to find a healthy balance between his father's financial woes and the oppressive nature of the Commonwealth. With the new monarchy would return the flamboyance of court life, as well as theaters and other forms of entertainment that had been banned during the interregnum. But the return of a Stuart to the throne naturally came with difficulties, and this new reign was plagued with similar issues as those that caused the death of Charles I. One would think that after the English Civil War, any subsequent ruler would avoid the financial and religious discord that made Charles I so unpopular. However,

¹ Godfrey Davies, *The Restoration of Charles II: 1658-1660* (San Marino, CA: The Huntington Library, 1955), 314.

² J.R. Jones, *The Restored Monarchy: 1660-1688* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1979), 8.

despite the disastrous outcome of his father's reign, Charles II wore on the patience of the English people through his disagreements with Parliament due to his religious sympathies and constant need for money. The assumption that the will of the king must be tolerated by the people was the undoing of his father, and ultimately led to the downfall of his brother, after which Parliament would become supreme over the monarch in the British governmental sphere.

When talking about Charles II's restoration, it is crucial to first examine why it was necessary. Charles I, being at odds with Parliament, dissolved it multiple times for not voting him money (among other reasons), leading to the passage of a list of grievances against the King and resulting in his defeat in the English Civil War. The government, controlled by Cromwell, then proceeded to execute the king as a traitor, although Charles denied to his end the legitimacy of the body that condemned him.

When asked if he would pardon the executioner, Charles replied that "the King cannot pardon a subject that willfully spills his blood," for the reason that he, the source of the law, could not consent to the ultimate lawlessness of high treason.³ It was custom for the condemned person to pardon the headsman for executing him, signifying that they were only carrying out the sentence. Charles I's refusal to pardon his executioner was an abnormality, showing that Charles held anyone who did not prevent his death to be treasonous. On the other hand, an actor of the day named Quin justified Charles's execution "by all the laws he had left them,"⁴ showing that at least some people viewed Charles as treasonous to himself by breaking his own laws. Therefore, executing Charles as a traitor and subjecting him to the same laws imposed on the general populace was an indication that the monarch was not above the law. Charles II was undoubtedly aware of this idea when he made his return, lest he lose his head as well.

While Charles II may have found it necessary to tread carefully, it would be wrong to say that the entire country was in favor of the death of Charles I. As a matter of fact, many people at the time were appalled that Parliament would presume to execute an anointed monarch, as evidenced by the reaction of the crowd to his beheading. A spectator later reported that when the axe descended and the blow was struck, "there was such a groan by the thousands then present as I never heard before and desire I may never hear

³ Hugh Ross Williamson, *The Day They Killed the King* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), 145-146.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 17.

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again,”⁵ showing that while the people in power called for Charles's death, much of the general public disapproved. In fact, various groups would eventually venerate Charles as a martyr,⁶ indicating how revolutionary and unheard of the idea of executing a king was at the time.

When Charles I was executed, the House of Commons quickly met to prevent the proclamation of his son as king.⁷ The rightful king found himself a fugitive in England, with a reward of £1,000 on his head.⁸ This hefty price meant that Charles would have to be careful with whom he trusted in his flight to France and ensuing exile. While in France he bided his time, waiting for Cromwell to falter or show an opening. Then, on September 3rd, 1658, Cromwell died, and a stirring of Royalist sympathy began to threaten the authority of the Commonwealth. Richard Cromwell served for a short stint as Lord Protector, but the election of the Convention Parliament with a Royalist majority ensured Charles II's return.⁹ On April 28th, 1660, less than two years after Oliver Cromwell's death, a letter by Charles was given to the House of Commons, stating his interest to return. Parliament's reaction was swift, as they voted £50,000 to the King and declared that he should be invited to return at once and rule them.¹⁰ From a constitutional perspective, it was as if the last nineteen years had never happened¹¹ Perhaps the most comforting aspect of the Restoration was that it was done peacefully,¹² unlike so many previous changes of power. In light of this, the English people saw smooth waters ahead. However, it was not to be, for Charles II had spent too much time in Catholic France.

The most significant issue throughout the reigns of the Stuart period was unquestionably religion. One can hardly blame the Stuarts, as they were foreigners (Scots) who received the crown from a Tudor dynasty that had rejected Roman Catholicism less than a century before, then switched back and forth several times at the expense of the people. Still, the sovereign of England at this time was expected to conform to the Anglican Church, a demand to

⁵ Christopher Hibbert, *Charles I* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 280.

⁶ Faber, *'The Blessed King Charles the Martyr' as he appeared to 18th-century Tories*, 1717, National Portrait Gallery, London.

⁷ Williamson, 151.

⁸ Arthur Bryant, *King Charles II* (London; New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936), 25.

⁹ Davies, 338-340.

¹⁰ Bryant, 71.

¹¹ Tim Harris, *Restoration: Charles II and his Kingdoms, 1660-1685* (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 47.

¹² Bryant, 78.

which the later Stuarts never seemed to acquiesce. Charles I's grandmother, Mary Queen of Scots, was Catholic, his wife Henrietta Maria was Catholic, and all of his offspring were feared (for good reason) to be Catholic. However, Charles I himself seemed to pick and choose what he would believe.

Prior to his execution, Charles claimed that, "my conscience in religion is, I think, very well known to all the world, and therefore I declare before you all that I die a Christian according to the profession of the Church of England as I found it left me by my father."¹³ Here, in the last minutes of his life, he was a professed Anglican. On the other hand, Hugh Ross Williamson, a noted historian, claims that Charles was put to death because during his reign, he undertook to establish Presbyterianism "at the point of Scottish Swords as the State religion of England," reasoning that Cromwell "disliked the presbyter only slightly less than the priest," and that "he could not forgive Charles's tenderness to Presbyterianism."¹⁴ It is intriguing to think that while almost his entire family was sympathetic to Catholics, Charles I seems to have headed in a different direction, favoring the Scottish faith. Nevertheless, his faith still contributed to his death.

Charles II may have learned from his father's religious woes, but he seemed not to heed them entirely. Within two years of the Restoration, he married a Catholic, Catherine of Braganza. This all but ensured that if Charles produced an heir, he would become Catholic through the nature of being more closely associated with his mother than with his father. To cause further public discord, Charles' brother, the Duke of York also married a Catholic.¹⁵ This was something that Charles could have prevented, and in hindsight probably should have. Parliament advised the King to keep the marriage from happening, but he was "not inclined to listen," showing a disregard to Parliament that echoed his father's arrogant behavior, which could by no means be beneficial to the Stuarts.¹⁶ In spite of this, the English people "did not know that Charles was himself a Catholic" as evidenced by his deathbed conversion to Catholicism.¹⁷ However, his associations and actions as monarch caused suspicion, and "in every place where he wrote 'dissent' the English mind read 'Pope of Rome.'"¹⁸

¹³ Williamson, 144.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 20-21.

¹⁵ J. Fitzgerald Molloy, *Royalty Restored; or London under Charles II* (London: Downey and Co. Limited, 1897) 248.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 248.

¹⁷ *The Last Days of Charles II*, 43-45.

¹⁸ Osmund Airy, *The English Restoration and Louis XIV: from the Peace of Westphalia to the Peace of Nimwegen* (New York: Scribner, 1902), 128.

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As a result, “hatred of Catholicism, fear of the Duke of York, and distrust of the king disturbed the nation to its core.”¹⁹ The English nation thought that it was at risk of sinking under the influence of Catholicism once again, after over a century of switching back and forth between Catholic and Protestant monarchs. For these reasons, Parliament began thinking of ways to combat the growing influence of Catholicism in court life as well as in the government.

When the Stuart Dynasty was first restored to the throne, Charles II's relationship with Parliament was cautious, as he hoped to divert suspicion in the early days of his reign by deferring to the government's authority until his rule was secure enough to dissolve Parliament, a power still granted to him by the constitution.²⁰ However, Parliament had learned from the extravagant personalities of Charles I and his father James I, and they significantly limited the amount of money that they voted their new monarch.²¹

The lack of money limited Charles in two crucial ways. Primarily, it ensured that Charles could not form an army, because he wouldn't be able to pay it. This was an important issue to the English people, who had witnessed the formation of two large armies by both Charles I and Parliament in the recent Civil War, and had afterwards endured a decade of military rule. If one thing was generally agreed on in the public mind, it was that they would not suffer another Cromwell-esque militaristic regime, whether it was imposed by a dictatorial lord protector or an anointed monarch.²²

The second purpose for voting Charles less money was the simple fact that it would guarantee that Parliament met more often. If the king dissolved Parliament whenever he wished, then they would only stay dissolved for as long as he could fund his affairs, after which he would need them to approve giving him more money. Also, it is likely that abusing his dissolution powers caused actual resentment among the elected officials, which could influence them to vote even less money his way. Therefore, as a testament to Charles II's caution not to overstep his power, Parliament was called in every year but two between 1660 and 1681.²³ In contrast, his father had ruled alone for eleven years, dissolving Parliament in 1629 and not re-calling it until 1640. The dreadful outcome of Charles I's disputes with Parliament was surely enough in itself to discourage Charles II from defying them to too great of an extent.

¹⁹ Molloy, 255.

²⁰ Airy, 89.

²¹ Jones, 30.

²² Airy, 89.

²³ Jones, 30.

Despite Charles II's caution with Parliament, the Anglican government proved unable to tolerate a king who was a Catholic sympathizer. This religious tension culminated in a series of anti-Catholic legislation, all geared toward the king's brother. It had been noted that while the Duke of York still attended church services with the king, he no longer received the sacrament.²⁴ Parliament responded to this scandalous discovery by the passage of the Test Act in 1673, which stated that "all persons holding office, or place of trust, or profit, should take the oaths of supremacy and allegiance in a public court; receive the sacrament according to the Church of England in some parish church on the Lord's Day."²⁵ Charles II reluctantly allowed the passage of the bill, naturally in return for the money that he needed for the ongoing war against the Dutch.²⁶ The desired response was swift, as the Duke of York immediately resigned his post as Lord High Admiral of England,²⁷ confirming suspicions that he was a papist. While Charles was able to deny his Catholic tendencies until his death, his brother was clearly led by a conscience that rendered him unable to put any worldly institution over his faith. The feeling among Englishmen regarding "popery" at the time was that "it was the first duty of his King to hate and combat 'this last and insolentest attempt on the credulity of mankind,'"²⁸ and Charles was warned on a consistent basis that his brother's Catholicism was the main cause of his problems.²⁹ In that light, Charles' inability to effectively handle his brother and his blatantly Catholic friends, and in some cases his encouragement of their behavior was the basis of why the Stuarts eventually fell from power.

Parliament's displeasure with the Duke of York was actualized in the Exclusion Bill of 1680, an aptly named piece of legislation that was meant to "exclude" the Duke from the royal line of succession. It was felt that James had gained complete ascendancy over the will of Charles,³⁰ making the prospect of a Catholic king seem far more immediate in the public eye.³¹ Therefore, the ministers of the opposition began to seek a deal with Charles regarding his brother's exclusion. The king's agreement rested on the only thing that he

²⁴ Molloy, 241.

²⁵ Ibid, 241.

²⁶ John Miller, *James II* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 69.

²⁷ Molloy, 245.

²⁸ Airy, 126.

²⁹ Miller, 69.

³⁰ Edward Hale, *The Fall of the Stuarts and Western Europe: from 1678 to 1697* (New York: Scribner, 1901), 43.

³¹ Miller, 92.

wanted out of Parliament: the voting of more money and supplies. He requested that the money be voted to him first, before any decision was made on the exclusion, a ploy that ended in stalemate, for the Whigs knew that he would dissolve Parliament the moment that he had what he wanted.³² Due to this impasse, nothing was left but the dissolution of Parliament, with neither side getting what they wished. From here, Parliament would take the fate of the country into its own hands, and the power of the nation shifted from King to Parliament.

Although it didn't happen in his lifetime, the reign of Charles II was disastrous for the Stuart family and monarchical power. Each time the king called Parliament, it was to ask for money, and only in the possibility of fulfilling his monetary needs would he humor their demands about religion. Although he converted to Catholicism on his deathbed, his life was a virtual tug-of-war between Anglicanism and Catholicism, and he tried his best to toe a razor-thin line, giving neither side the clear advantage. This behavior proved to wear on the patience of Parliament, who must have grown tired of Charles II's indecisiveness while the future promised a Catholic king. Parliament's fears were realized when Charles died in 1685, and his brother ascended the throne as James II. A couple of years into James' Catholic rule, Parliament invited William of Orange and his wife Mary (Daughter of James II) to take the throne as a Protestant alternative. In December 1689, less than a year into their reign, William III and Mary II allowed the passage of the English Bill of Rights, which declared that "James, with the help of evil counselors, had attempted to destroy the Protestant religion and the laws and liberties of the kingdom,"³³ echoing the rhyme that said as much about the oppressive efforts of the Commonwealth.

The bill significantly limited the power of the sovereign, ending the king's ability to dissolve Parliament, and claimed that William and Mary's reign was legitimized by Parliament's affirmation.³⁴ From then on, the King or Queen of England ruled by right of Parliament, and all of their powers rested in the fact that Parliament sanctioned them. The inability of Charles II to quell his brother's religious tendencies, and his ensuring that he became king were direct causes of the dissatisfaction of Parliament. Because of Charles' Catholic sympathies, the rule of James II quickly resulted in the Glorious Revolution, and the subsequent dominance of Parliament over the sovereign. Therefore, the question of religion

³² Hale, 44-45.

³³ David Ogg, *England in the Reigns of James II and William III* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), 241.

³⁴ Ogg, 242.

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was present at the restoration of Charles II, and because of the way he managed it, became the instrument for his brother's downfall.

QUESTIONS OF MODERN WAR AND GEOGRAPHY



Articles

Considering Clausewitz Across Contexts

by Laura Salter

*A Synthesis of James Howard Kunstler's Themes of Urbanization and the
Impending Oil Crisis*

by Will Humphrey



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CONSIDERING CLAUSEWITZ ACROSS CONTEXTS

By Laura Salter

One of the greatest phenomena of human history is man's penchant for destruction: namely, by waging war. Mankind's ability to organize and execute combat has developed drastically over the centuries, with philosophies of its purpose, justice, and motivations flourishing alongside. Few military theories have achieved the longevity and diverse applicability of that of Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz (see Figure 2). His magnum opus *On War* (originally *Vom Kriege*) was published posthumously in 1832. Since then, it has been studied and re-studied, analyzed and reviewed, praised and criticized, and used as a key text by scholars and soldiers alike. What explains the continuous relevance of Clausewitz's theory, despite changing contexts and technology? Clausewitz's addition to the philosophical discussion was uniquely suited to apply to a host of cases, across diverse cultures and vastly different streams of political thought. His intention and his methods aimed for accuracy and applicability. First, he achieved this by defining war as a tool of politics fundamentally composed of political reason, the hatred or will of the people, and chance. These ideas in addition to his methodology and approach to the subject, and his description of the nature of war and of man's reactions therein, has allowed Clausewitz's theory to influence a tremendously diverse spectrum of readers and remain a uniquely flexible and applicable treatise on war.

Writing in the shadow of the Napoleonic Wars, Clausewitz brought to his treatise the expertise of having been a soldier, and the worldview of having seen a massive war restructure the political landscape of Europe. He built his theories largely on his observations of the years in and around Napoleon's reign. The French Revolution of 1789 was the beginning of the end of the monarchy, preceding decades of violence in the continent. In the 1790s, a young Napoleon Bonaparte witnessed his country descend from revolution into anarchy and terror.¹ Struggling to self-identify either as a republic or a monarchy, France's tumult bred factions and resulted in a vacuum of structure in politics and the military. In 1799, Napoleon became First Consul.

By 1804, he had declared himself emperor, and was ready to wage a ferocious war to expand his empire over the continent. He reorganized the French army and pioneered the permanent corps structure—already altering the

¹ Robert Asprey, *The Rise of Napoleon Bonaparte* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 45.

way modern war would be conducted and demonstrating his strategic brilliance.² Napoleon's triumphs during the years that followed were unprecedented, until the scope of his armies and his battles grew so large that strategic errors became inevitable.³ Finally, his downfall began with the Peninsular War of 1808-1813, when Spanish nationalistic sentiment, with British support, fueled a fight against Napoleon's appointment of his brother as king of Spain.⁴ In 1812, Napoleon faced a war on another front with his infamous invasion and disastrous retreat from Russia. 1814 brought the end of French *gloire* as Russian and British troops invaded France with the help of a renewed ally: Prussia, home of Carl von Clausewitz.

Clausewitz bore witness to the political and militaristic events occurring across the continent, a context whose role was paramount as it provided allusions and references found in his theory. King Frederick's Prussia joined the war against France in 1806, but suffered significant defeats in the Battles of Jena and Auerstadt on October 14. A passionately distraught article published in 1813 described the shocking wreckage and torrential bloodshed that ensued when the formidable Prussian forces met the "modern tactics of France."⁵ The loss shattered Prussian spirits. What followed was a period of demoralization and subordination that bolstered a new trend of nationalist sentiment.⁶

Young Prussians, like Clausewitz, were driven by patriotism and resentment to pursue military reform and eventually repel the French invaders. Clausewitz was born in 1780 and had entered the Prussian Army a mere 12 years later, in 1792. From 1801-1803, he studied at the Military School at Berlin, where he became acquainted with men who greatly influenced the Prussian military, as well as Clausewitz's own life and works, like General Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who became one of Clausewitz's major mentors.⁷ Over the course of his life, Clausewitz experienced the breadth of military service. He served as aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus of Prussia; was wounded, taken prisoner, and kept in France; and he assisted with the reformation of the Prussian Army in the period following its defeat. The

² Gregory Fremont-Barnes and Todd Fisher, *The Napoleonic Wars: The Rise and Fall of an Empire* (Botley, Oxford: Osprey Publishing Limited, 2004), 10.

³ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴ *Funk & Wagnalls New World Encyclopedia* (2016): s.v. "Napoleonic Wars."

⁵ "Destructive Effects of the War," *Jamaica Magazine* 3, no. 2 (February 1813): 95.

⁶ Fremont-Barnes and Fisher, 253-256.

⁷ *Dictionary of World Biography*, Vol. 5, s.v. "Carl von Clausewitz."

modernization of the army imitated the effective methodology of the French *Grande Armée*—it was reorganized, no longer based on nobility or seniority, and featured modernized tactics for warfare.⁸ Later, Clausewitz became the military instructor to Prussian Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, which gave him the opportunity to pen his emergent military theories in his essay *Principles of War*.⁹ In 1812, Clausewitz left to fight alongside the Russians. At this point, Prussia had been under French occupation for five long years. It was under these circumstances that Clausewitz assisted in the negotiations of the pivotal convention of Tauroggen in 1812, wherein General Ludwig York set the stage for an alliance with Russia and other nations that opposed Napoleon, abandoning Prussia's French alliance.¹⁰ Clausewitz remained in the Russian service until 1814. The following year, the fateful Battle of Waterloo brought the Napoleonic Wars to a close. Napoleon abdicated his throne and was exiled. The wars were over, but their impact resounded.

Clearly, the time period was critical to the development of Clausewitz's thought. Most of his life was devoted to and surrounded by warfare. A military man since the age of 12, his brilliant and studious mind was saturated with strategy. Clausewitz began to climb in the ranks to become Chief of Staff of several corps over the years, and was named Director of the Military School at Berlin in 1818.¹¹ His experience in the field provided practical examples of how states behave and pursue power, giving his studies a historical foundation rooted in practical experience. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars were so pivotal to military development and European political society that emerging theories of war had to compete with one another while keeping up with the changing nature of politics and warfare.¹² Clausewitz began writing his observations and ideas into eight books to address this lack of a consistent understanding.

Crucial to a discussion of the historical and personal influences on Clausewitz's work is mention of his most significant relationship, his intellectual stimulant: his wife, Marie von Clausewitz. A well-educated woman for her time, Marie was a close observer of the Napoleonic Wars and

⁸ Fremont-Barnes and Fisher, 263.

⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *Principles of War*, trans./ed. by Hans Wilhelm Gatzke, Vol. 82 (Harrisburg: PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1942), accessed October 9, 2016.

¹⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, *The Campaign of 1812 in Russia*, trans. by Francis Egerton (London: John Murray, 1843), accessed 06 November 2016.

¹¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, translator's note, 12-13.

¹² "Destructive Effects of the War," 97.

outspokenly political.¹³ Through years of correspondence followed by a loving marriage, Marie was privy to the formation of her husband's celebrated theory of war. In her preface to *On War*, she wrote that as they shared everything in their marriage, he "could not be occupied on a work of this kind without its being known to [her]."¹⁴ In 1831, after over a decade of collecting his thoughts and writing his seminal work, Carl von Clausewitz died of cholera. It fell to his late wife to edit his transcripts and publish *On War* posthumously. This is noteworthy because the author, himself, only had the opportunity to completely edit one book of his volume, and the rest were revised and assembled by editors and his wife. Some scholars suggest that this is causal of contradictions and misinterpretations of the text, but Clausewitz's notes,



Marie von Clausewitz

correspondences, and completed sections of his work present a generally consistent theory of war.¹⁵

In his preface to *On War*, Clausewitz defined his terms, stating that there are two possible objects of war: the overthrow of the enemy or territorial conquest, both of which can manifest themselves in a variety of sub-goals. He then introduced the cornerstone of his treatise. War, he wrote, is a "continuation of politics by other means."¹⁶ This phrase became one of Clausewitz's most celebrated ideas, and is key to the continued prevalence of his work in political spheres.

War is not an end to itself; it is a tool employed within the greater political context to achieve a specific purpose. Clausewitz made this point intentionally, well aware of its influence on his theory's applicability. If war is a political choice, the manifestation of each war will "differ in character according to the nature of the motives and circumstances from which [it] proceeds."¹⁷

Interpretations of Clausewitz's point have varied. A popular usage is to say that

¹³ Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, "The Other Clausewitz: Findings from the Newly Discovered Correspondence between Marie and Carl von Clausewitz," *Journal of Military History* 79, no. 2 (April 2015): 348.

¹⁴ Clausewitz, *On War*, 6.

¹⁵ Bellinger, 365-366.

¹⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*, 9.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 25

if war is a type of policy, then military matters should be subordinate to the government and the people.¹⁸ Clausewitz's description does support this idea; since war is created in pursuit of a political aim, it must remain directly in rational proportion to its goal. If expenditures surpass the worth of the object, then the war must be terminated.¹⁹ War as an extension of policy became *On War's* signature idea, and indeed was an influential concept in the understanding of why states go to war. However, there is a risk in reducing Clausewitz's work to this sole axiom.

A second, uniquely flexible point that Clausewitz makes is the "trinity" of war. War, he says, is fundamentally based on hatred and animosity, chance, and policy or reason.²⁰ Connected to these three objects are three principle characters: the people, the Army, and the Government. The three elements of the trinity are not necessarily equal in magnitude, nor are they in a fixed ratio—therein lies the unique flexibility afforded by this principle. Over the centuries when faced with different case studies, the dominance of a particular sphere of the trinity could change. A graphical analysis by Janeen Klinger published in *Parameters* depicted the fluctuation in proportions of the trinity from the 18th to the 20th century. Klinger demonstrated that in the latter era, hatred and enmity grew to be equal in proportion to policy and chance in the makeup of war, which changed the motives and execution of warfare.²¹ This corresponded to Clausewitz's observations of both Prussians and Spaniards, whose resentment toward occupation became a primary force for reform and resistance. Since no particular aspect was the driving factor of Clausewitz's theory, war itself appeared to shapeshift in response to its variant composition. The trinity adds to the widespread relevance of *On War* as it addresses the foundational groups of any conflict in the political and military spheres.

The trinity is an important concept in *On War* because it distinguishes the spirit and morale of the nation as an intangible driving force, separate from tactics and logistics.

Rationally, it follows that Clausewitz included the emotional will of the people as one-third of the substance of war, even though war before Napoleon had relied much more on standing armies and paid soldiers. In Book I, while describing wars of entire communities, Clausewitz wrote that war "of whole

¹⁸ Thomas Waldman, "Politics and War: Clausewitz's Paradoxical Equation," *Parameters* 40, no. 3 (Autumn, 2010): 2.

¹⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 19.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 26.

²¹ Janeen Klinger, "The Social Science of Carl von Clausewitz," *Parameters* 36, no. 1 (Spring, 2006): 86.

Nations...always starts from a political condition.”²² Prussia’s military reformation movement was a direct result of nationalist sentiment against the French occupiers and recognition of the need for modernization.²³ Likewise, this transformation of the trinity can be applied to a host of conflicts born out of nationalism or resentment toward occupiers in the following centuries. Consider the Algerian War of Independence. A repressed French colony since 1830, Algeria began its own resistance movement against the French in 1954, led by the National Liberation Front (FLN). Algerians, who did not yet have their own nation-state, engaged in battles, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism against the brutality and torture employed by French troops.²⁴ The core of this conflict was deeply psychological. Terrorist tactics used by the FLN were driven largely by hatred and vengeance, while torture by French paratroopers caused further alienation. In fact, these counter-terrorism efforts helped the Algerian nationalist cause by winning over international opinion and polarizing French public opinion.²⁵

In Clausewitzian terms, both the FLN and the government of France pursued political aims: for the former, political independence, and for the latter, the submission or appeasement of its colony. These political aims made the two sides diametrically opposed—but the brutality and terror of the conflict drew primarily from decades of enmity and resentment borne of mistreatment. All three elements of the Clausewitzian trinity were present, but it was morale and the willingness of the people to commit terror that won the Battle of Algiers. The intentional adaptability of Clausewitz’s trinity allows his theory to be applied to numerous wars and conflicts, and is surely evidence of *On War*’s continued relevance.

While the ideas found in *On War* are deeply significant, equally noteworthy is the methodology used by Clausewitz. *On War* addressed at length the failures of other theorists to create a comprehensive theoretical construction of war, but Clausewitz’s preface rejected the idea that such a theory was impossible.²⁶ Book III Chapter XVII, “On the Character of Modern War” described how war had changed under Napoleon, “since all methods formerly usual were upset by [his] luck and boldness.”²⁷ Previously, war had been

²² Clausewitz, *On War*, 24.

²³ Fremont-Barnes and Fisher, 253-256.

²⁴ Nancy Gallagher, “Learning Lessons from the Algerian War of Independence,” *Middle East Report*, no.225 (2002): 45.

²⁵ Gallagher, 45.

²⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*, 10.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 121.

characterized by long periods of standstill—what Clausewitz refers to as the “suspension of the act of war,” an inevitable pause in hostilities while the armies rested in defense.²⁸ In fact, Clausewitz said that most earlier wars spent more time in this “state of equilibrium” than in conflict.²⁹ This was one noticeable change of Napoleon’s wars. As the impassioned *Jamaica Magazine* reported about the particularly heightened violence of the Napoleonic Wars, “no equal time has ever witnessed such horrors, such wholesale butcheries, such wanton devastations, such complicated miseries inflicted by man on man, as the last ten years!”³⁰ Again, the context was a key part of the development of Clausewitz’s theory. His approach to the subject had to be realistic and as comprehensive as possible.

Clausewitz’s approach to the study of war was unique in its fusion of the philosophical with the physical. In Book I of *On War*, Clausewitz created his framework of analysis, emphasizing the importance of both rational and non-rational elements of warfare. Prior to Clausewitz, theories of war were focused on “things belonging to the material world,” merely a “mechanical art” with little regard given to the “energies of the mind and the spirit.”³¹ Clausewitz criticized these attempts to create “positive theories” of war based purely on mathematical principles, tactics, and materials. “They strive after determinate quantities, whilst in War all is undetermined, and the calculation has always to be made with varying quantities.”³² His problem with this method of theory-generation revealed his purpose in writing—not to simply educate on how to win battles, but to understand the foundations, and the nature, of war. This set him apart in his era and beyond.

To Clausewitz, war was to be considered a “game both objectively and subjectively.”³³ The element of chance, as included in the trinity, was inexorably linked to the outcome of war. Clausewitz acknowledges the unpredictability of war and a leader’s imperfect knowledge of the circumstance and of how an enemy will respond. These elements of the nature of war, like its unpredictability, unknown circumstances, and need for military genius, created what Clausewitz termed “friction.”³⁴ Friction was what separated war “on paper” from how war was experienced in reality— “incidents take place upon

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 118.

²⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 123.

³⁰ “Destructive Effects of the War,” 92.

³¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 57.

³² *Ibid.*, 59.

³³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 23.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 50.

which it was impossible to calculate, their chief origin being chance.”³⁵ These uncontrollable elements were fundamental to Clausewitz’s method of explaining war. He was unsatisfied with competing theories that were built on mathematical rules and absolutes. “Theory must also take into account the human element; it must accord a place to courage, to boldness, even to rashness.”³⁶

One such competing theorist was Antoine-Henri Jomini, a Swiss military theorist contemporaneous with Clausewitz. Jomini published his own treatise, *Traité de grande tactique*, in 1803. Like *On War*, it was influenced greatly by the experience of the Napoleonic Wars, albeit from the opposing side, as well as observations of King Frederick’s Prussian army.³⁷ However, Jomini’s presentation in this work was practical and utilitarian, compared to Clausewitz’s more comprehensive approach. Jomini sought to describe fixed values, physical forces, and certainty, while Clausewitz was determined to include the factors of friction.³⁸ This difference could not have been due to disinterest in material advice on Clausewitz’s part; his preliminary writings for the Prussian Crown Prince actually praised Jomini’s advice on strategy.³⁹ But when the time came to create a viable, transmutable theory of war, Clausewitz rejected the positivist, scientific approach. In fact, Christopher Bassford speculated that *On War*’s criticism of other military theories is aimed at his Swiss counterpart.⁴⁰ Jomini, similarly, did not withhold criticism of Clausewitz’s pretentious style.⁴¹ However, Clausewitz’s death denied him the chance of reading Jomini’s later-published, revised theory. *Summary of the Art of War*, published in 1838, expanded the content of Jomini’s theory of war to include morale, the limits of scientific military theory, and the relationship between politics and war—ideas that were likely borrowed from Clausewitz.⁴² The Prussian’s unique approach to the study of war was quick to influence the continent’s other seminal thinkers.

Another feature of Clausewitz’s methodology was his demonstrated interest in historical examples and observable case studies. In the book’s opening notice, Clausewitz wrote: “Investigation and observation, philosophy and experience,

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*, 23.

³⁷ Antoine-Henri Jomini, *Traité de grande tactique* (University of Lausanne, 1806), 16.

³⁸ *Dictionary of World Biography*, Vol. 5, s.v. “Carl von Clausewitz.”

³⁹ Clausewitz, *Principles of War*, section 11.

⁴⁰ Christopher Bassford, “Jomini and Clausewitz: their interaction,” *An edited version of a paper presented to the 23rd Meeting of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe at Georgia State University*, vol. 26., 1993, 7.

⁴¹ Ibid., 8.

⁴² Bassford, “Jomini and Clausewitz,” 8.

must neither despise nor exclude one another...the propositions of this book...are supported either by experience or by the conception of War itself as external points, so that they are not without abutments.”⁴³ *On War* was punctuated by references to the Napoleonic Wars used to illustrate greater, more abstract qualities of the nature of war. Spain’s “stubborn resistance” during the Peninsular Wars showed how powerfully effective the “general arming of the people” and insurgent groups could be, while Prussia proved adding militia to the army to be a significant force multiplier.⁴⁴ Both concrete, historical examples showed Clausewitz’s greater point. The “heart and sentiments of a Nation” were deeply significant to its political and military strength—and this would, inevitably, change how War was fought and organized.⁴⁵ His purpose in writing *On War*, though, did not lead him to describe specific campaigns or tactics in detail; each example that he provided was an illustration of important aspects of war and their corresponding human reactions.⁴⁶ Clausewitz acknowledged that although war was being waged in new, unprecedented ways, he could observe and draw general principles from historical experience. Similarly, the modern reader knows that despite further changes since *On War*’s beginnings, an understanding of the past and its lessons can benefit understanding of the present.⁴⁷

An additional key aspect of *On War*’s methodology was Clausewitz’s use of a dialectic model, which alternated between discussion of total war and limited war. “Total war” referred to a theoretical construct in which war was fought to bend the adversary’s will; it was the abstraction, or the idealized essence, of war.⁴⁸ A mathematical consideration of this concept showed that each side of a conflict would increase its use of force in proportion to its enemy’s resistance, and in this pure world, the mutual enhancement would never have reason to stop until the enemy was destroyed.⁴⁹ Limited war, by contrast, was war’s concrete manifestation, within the natural boundaries and “friction” of reality. Real war would not come to the utmost extreme of violence. The inherent assumption was that only the second form could exist, because of the

⁴³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 11.

⁴⁴ Clausewitz, *On War*, 121.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 121-122.

⁴⁶ Peter Paret, “*On War* Then and Now,” *Journal of Military History* 80, no. 2 (April 2016): 483.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 484.

⁴⁸ Peter R. Moody, “Clausewitz and the Fading Dialectic of War,” *World Politics* 31, no. 3 (1979): 422.

⁴⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 16.

disorder of reality and the importance of chance.

However, it is now argued that nuclear technology has brought the abstraction of total war into potential, physical existence.⁵⁰ Nuclear weaponry has, undeniably, changed the dialogue that accompanies modern warfare. Senator J. William Fulbright, a critic of Clausewitz, made the claim that nuclear weapons make the inevitable ends of war completely disproportionate to any political aims, rendering Clausewitz's doctrine "totally obsolete."⁵¹ The mentality toward war was altered fundamentally as the world came to understand nuclear weaponry; the capacity for destruction was immeasurably heightened. But does this change the applicability of Clausewitz's theory? Clausewitz would not have foreseen the advent of total war in the real world. However, by anyone's estimation, it is irrational to fight a nuclear war due to Mutually Assured Destruction.

As Clausewitz pointed out, military action will "in general diminish as the political object diminishes."⁵² In other words, political motivation and morale must be incredibly high in order for reason and rationale to permit total war to occur. It is worth returning to the original cornerstone of Clausewitz's theory here: war is a *continuation* of politics by other means. His point has not been lost; instead, the political means have had to be adjusted. The Cold War era witnessed nuclear superpowers engaging in proxy wars, indirectly pursuing political ideology, and engaging in nuclear brinkmanship. Clausewitz was aware that warfare could change, and he built that awareness into his theoretical framework. As he wrote, "the tendency to destroy the adversary which lies at the bottom of the conception of War is in no way changed or modified through the progress of civilisation."⁵³ Political reason, chance, and the morale of the people are still key determinants of warfare, even if the components of Clausewitz's dialectical method have been transformed into a physical reality that the theorist did not foresee.

In fact, the dialectical model's description of total war has been the subject of significant debate within political thought over the years. Undoubtedly, one of the most notorious admirers of Clausewitz was Adolf Hitler. Nazi Germany was developed at the hands of German National Socialists who revered Clausewitz as an exemplary nationalist and soldier.⁵⁴ Germans

⁵⁰ Moody, 418.

⁵¹ Moody, 418.

⁵² Clausewitz, *On War*, 19.

⁵³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 15.

⁵⁴ P.M. Baldwin, "Clausewitz in Nazi Germany," *Journal of Contemporary History* 16, no. 1 (1981): 10.

celebrated the Prussian military from 1805-1813 as a movement that paralleled the Nazi movement of the time.⁵⁵ Hitler himself quoted Clausewitz on numerous occasions, both aloud and in his writings, always in defense of Nazism's embrace of total war.⁵⁶ Clausewitz wrote that adding any principle of moderation to the practice of war was irrational, since absolute war occurs at the peak escalation of violence between actors.⁵⁷ With the dialectic model in view, it was understood that this ideal form of war existed only in abstraction, and he did not intend this model to advocate absolute brutality. Nevertheless, Hitler found the justification and inspiration that he sought. Hitler quoted Clausewitz to reprimand his more moderate generals. He was keenly aware of the use of war as an extension of politics, stating as early as 1931 that "anyone familiar with the thinking of Clausewitz and Schlieffen knows that military strategy can also be used in the political battle."⁵⁸ His was an uncompromising, absolute battle with existential political aims. The complete destruction of the enemy was the only possible outcome, and so politics became an extension of war.⁵⁹ An unfair criticism of Clausewitz blames his work for the horror of the World Wars, but understanding his dialectical model and abstraction reveals that the guilt of misusing a theory lies in the hands of the reader, not the author.

Clausewitz influenced a number of other influential leaders and theorists. He is strongly associated with Marxist-Leninist military thought. Lenin, struggling to understand the beginnings of World War I, first read *On War* in 1915, recorded his observations, and applied Clausewitz's thought to political socialism.⁶⁰ Clausewitz was instrumental in the transformation of Lenin's own philosophy on foreign policy and imperialist war. Lenin's essay "The Principles of Socialism and the War, 1914-1915" connected Marxist ideas of class struggle to Clausewitz's description of war as political means.⁶¹ In 1917, it was easy, then, to categorize the Russian Revolution as a war that could bring the Marxist faction to power through the class struggle. Eventually, the Marxist-Leninist movement used *On War's* terminology to describe the war between the

⁵⁵ Adolf Hitler, "Proclamation read by Gauleiter Adolf Wagner" (speech, Nurnberg, September 6, 1938), Collection of Speeches 1922-1945.

⁵⁶ Baldwin, 10.

⁵⁷ Clausewitz, *On War*, 15.

⁵⁸ Baldwin, 11.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁶⁰ Jacob W. Kip, "Lenin and Clausewitz: The Militarization of Marxism, 1915-1921," in *Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991*, ed. William C. Frank and Philip S. Gillette (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992), 68.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 70.

“proletarian state” and the capitalist, “bourgeois world,” calling for the militarization of Marxism.⁶² Lenin was impressed by Clausewitz’s practical information regarding defensive and offensive tactics, but he was especially interested in the discussion of the nature of war and its function in history. His own communist ideology merged with Clausewitz’s philosophy and created a hybrid ideology in response to World War I: war was a continuation of politics by violent means, therefore that war was a violent defense of capitalist states’ interests.⁶³

Clausewitz’s theories have been found in Anglo-American military thought as well, although not as a constantly acknowledged presence.⁶⁴ Christopher Bassford points out that enthusiasm for Clausewitz was elevated in the United States following the disastrous Vietnam War, parallel to the rise in popularity in England after the South African War.⁶⁵ He attributes this occurrence to the Clausewitz’s description of war as politics, subject to the government and enacted by the army and people. The trinity’s shared responsibility in this respect can reduce the weight of responsibility felt by the military, since the war was not its own prerogative, but a form of government policy. Clausewitz was mentioned periodically in American military literature, in such publications as *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, which discussed the implications of Clausewitz’s description of strategy versus tactics and the role of the trinity in matters of war.⁶⁶ His contribution to military thought affected both the philosophy and strategy taught in modern American military academies. Even President Eisenhower is reported to have named *On War* as the most influential military book that he had read, having read it three times.⁶⁷

Technological advancements have changed who is capable of widespread destruction and how quickly it can occur, but the essential nature of conflict remains as Clausewitz broadly stated in the trinity and in his link between politics and war. However, Clausewitz wrote with the expectation that

⁶² Ibid., 77.

⁶³ Azar Gat, “Clausewitz and the Marxists: Yet Another Look,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 27, no. 2 (1992): 371.

⁶⁴ Christopher Bassford, *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815- 1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 5.

⁶⁵ Bassford, *Clausewitz in English*, 203.

⁶⁶ J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., “Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy,” in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, 4th ed. (2010): 4-9.

⁶⁷ Carlo D’Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002; reprint, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2003), 168.

war would occur between nation-states, as history had demonstrated to that point. In the modern era, scholars termed as “New War theorists” have rejected Clausewitz based on this fact, in view of the rise of non-state actors and ethnic disputes.⁶⁸ However, the principles that Clausewitz laid out can feasibly be extrapolated to these modern phenomena. State-sponsored terrorism, for example, occurs when a foreign power funds or supports a terrorist organization to gain power in the region.⁶⁹ It is surely an extension of politics, as it is a strategic use of force to accomplish a certain political end. A clear case study of this concept is the Iranian-backed political-terrorist organization, Hezbollah. Hezbollah has been integrated into the Lebanese government as a political party that provides social services and infrastructure, as well as support for the families of suicide martyrs. Within Lebanon, Hezbollah is largely considered to be legitimate—possibly even more influential than the state or a regular political party.⁷⁰ However, the organization retains its own independent arms capability that it has used frequently throughout history to achieve its political goals, particularly in attacks on Israeli civilians and military.⁷¹ Despite its being a non-state actor, Hezbollah has organized military units, tactics studiously developed in correlation to Israel’s strengths, the support and passion of its nation, and rationally-determined policies. State-sponsored terrorism employs the three principles of the Clausewitzian trinity; in fact, it has been postulated that terrorism is a war-substitute that increases the proportion of hatred and enmity with respect to chance and political reason.⁷² Although terrorism is an indirect and asymmetric form of violence, defined differently than “war,” relevant comparisons can still be drawn. Clausewitz’s point that war is inseparable from politics remains as true as ever, and these new forms of warfare are challenging because of the modern-day complexity of political contexts.⁷³ But to deny *On War*’s adaptability is to ignore Clausewitz’s own prescient acknowledgment that war does change forms. “War is, therefore, not only chameleon-like in character, because it changes its colour in some degree in each particular case, but it is

⁶⁸ Bart Schuurman, “Clausewitz and the ‘New Wars’ Scholars,” *Parameters* 4-, no. 1 (Spring, 2010): 90.

⁶⁹ Brad Roberts, “Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Has the Taboo Been Broken?,” *Politics and the Life Sciences* 15, no. 2 (1996): 216.

⁷⁰ Julie C. Herrick, “Nonstate Actors: A Comparative Analysis of Change and Development within Hamas and Hezbollah,” *The Changing Middle East: A New Look at Regional Dynamics*, edited by Korany Baghat, American University in Cairo Press, 2011: 183.

⁷¹ Herrick, 187.

⁷² Klinger, 87.

⁷³ Waldman, 12.

also, as a whole, in relation to the predominant tendencies which are in it...”⁷⁴ According to Clausewitz, the form of war, itself, can change in relation to whichever third of the trinity is predominant. Violence, chance, and political ends are not foregone in the modern forms of war. They are present in the actions of non-state actors and terrorist organizations.

Altogether, *On War*’s content and methods aimed to describe the nature of war in reality. As already mentioned, this entailed some description of the strategy and purpose of entering a war, as well as the intangible elements of friction and moral forces. Clausewitz listed four elements that composed the “atmosphere” of war: danger, physical effort, uncertainty, and chance.⁷⁵ The existence of these conditions demanded a degree of courage and passion from the soldiers—and in times of difficulty, good leadership in the commander. Clausewitz did not pretend that war was a predictable game that could be perfectly played, or that armies operated as smoothly as machines. Like a man trying to walk in water, movement in war was always met with resistance—so the best war theorist, and the synthesis of Clausewitz’s dialectic model, was someone who had experienced the reality of war but could also draw generalizations about it.⁷⁶ War could best be theorized by a soldier-scholar who recognized that it was a social activity, subject to human emotion and dependent on both physical and moral forces.⁷⁷ *On War* does include technical details and information about strategy and tactics, but the overall themes of the work are illustrations of the nature of war and its human participants. All of these factors combined, from *On War*’s content, applications, and methods, culminated in a political philosophy of war whose relevance spanned generations. As author Antulio Echevarria II wrote, “Our understanding of war’s nature, or whether we believe it has one, influences how we approach the conduct of war—how we develop military strategy, doctrine and concepts, and train and equip combat forces.”⁷⁸ Clausewitz created a theoretical foundation, not to recommend specific strategy and tactics to the limited context of the 19th century, but to better comprehend the complex nature of war itself. Aware that his death could interrupt the revision of his theory, he acknowledged that his work might be “open to endless misconceptions” that would “give rise to a number of crude criticisms”, but despite its imperfection, he hoped that the impartial, truth-

⁷⁴ Clausewitz, *On War*, 26.

⁷⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, 38.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 50.


⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 128-129.

⁷⁸ Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Part II Chapter 3.

seeking reader would find “leading ideas which may bring about a revolution in the theory of War.”⁷⁹

Carl von Clausewitz’s life experiences granted him a distinct degree of expertise in the conduct and nature of war. The Napoleonic Wars provided fertile ground for the study of this violent streak in humanity that countless scholars and leaders have attempted to understand and better use. *On War* had short-term influence on other generals, military men, and theorists like Jomini following its publication. It had long-term effects on numerous world leaders and students of statecraft, in spite of the changing times. Clausewitz presented war as an extension of politics composed of a trinity of forces, used methodology which remains applicable, and wrote with the purpose of elucidating not only the strategic manner of warfare, but its very nature—and in doing so, he created a uniquely flexible understanding of the art of war. As the more recent historical examples have demonstrated, *On War*’s description of the nature of war and its components is linked to politics and to human nature. Its application, though misused by some and criticized by others, has nonetheless left an indelible mark on the understanding of war’s place in statecraft and political thought.

⁷⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 9.



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A SYNTHESIS OF JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER'S THEMES OF URBANIZATION AND THE IMPENDING OIL CRISIS

By Will Humphrey

For years, the human race has been developing and innovating itself and its surroundings to make life more comfortable. We construct buildings to live in, cars to get ourselves from place to place, and roadways to connect us. These developments greatly facilitate life, but they do it at a cost. American social critic and author James Howard Kunstler literarily attacks Americans' need to add comfort to our lives without any regard to the devastating effects of the adding on to buildings, consuming more energy, and the focus on facilitating everyday life. Kunstler, in response to this movement, has written four books that detail his fears: *Geography of Nowhere*, *Home from Nowhere*, *The City in Mind*, and *The Long Emergency*. *Geography of Nowhere* critiques the effects of suburban sprawl, or the continuous spreading of suburban developments into rural areas. *Home from Nowhere* similarly explores the same but focuses on the idea of the "American Dream" while offering a solution on how to make that dream a reality and avoiding suburban sprawl. In *The City in Mind*, Kunstler gives account of the histories of several cities such as Paris, Rome, Tenochtitlan, and Las Vegas, deciding where they went wrong and what still lasts among the better examples of his idea of New Urbanism. In writing about these cities, Kunstler offers suggestions as to how America may be revived. Finally, in *The Long Emergency*, Kunstler sheds light on the consequences of the blatant disregard Americans (and other people worldwide) have towards the availability of oil and on how this end of the cheap oil era may cause other lasting problems of the most sinister kind. In these four works, Kunstler chillingly asserts the horrors of suburban sprawl and of the impending death of cheap, attainable oil and offers solutions to these problems.

First, the suburban sprawl movement has been plaguing the United States and other parts of the world for decades. This is mainly due to modernism in America. Modernism, as apparent in architecture, can roughly be defined as the attempt to break away from conventional ideals of construction. Today, the modernist movement is evident in many of the big cities that Kunstler decries. In *Geography of Nowhere*, he says that the movement

did its immense damage...by divorcing the practice of building from the history and traditional meanings of building; by promoting a species of urbanism that destroyed age-old social arrangements and,

with them, urban life as a general proposition; and by creating a physical setting for man that failed to respect the limits of scale, growth, and the consumption of natural resources, or to respect the lives of other living things.¹

Essentially, the modernist movement threw away everything characteristically “good” about construction and architecture of the past and lost every notion of their functionalities. Kunstler explicitly and directly attacks modernism in his harping on the horrors of suburban sprawl. The idea of suburban sprawl is difficult to critique because one would assume that it is inevitable. It is common knowledge that the earth’s population is ever-growing, and with a growing population, society needs to accommodate it somehow. The chief way that humans make space for themselves, though, is through constructing more buildings in more spaces not otherwise occupied. Rural areas once used for farming are now smothered in concrete and lavish country areas have become large neighborhoods. This sprawl mainly leads to an increased car-dependency and replacing of civic art with zoning. While this is not an entirely incorrect practice, urban planners could devise a better use of territory. The word “sprawl” connotes a horizontal spread. It may be more beneficial to sprawl upwards, though. By building taller buildings to accommodate the growing population, cities may create more room for their citizens in a way that neither steals valuable farmland nor adds radial distance within the city.

In this day and age, Americans are so accustomed to using vehicles as the main method of transportation that they pay no heed to the fact that they are car-dependent. There was a time when schools were within walking distance, when libraries and restaurants required no pit stops at gas stations, and when traffic was hardly an issue. Now, however, Americans are so far removed from each other due to suburban sprawl that they cannot even get to work without driving across town for forty minutes. This separation by car has given Americans an excuse to desynchronize with each other so much that the American ideal is being eclipsed by the disconnect. Kunstler argues that because of this disconnect, Americans “have lost [their] knowledge of how physically to connect things in [their] everyday world, except by car and telephone.”² Kunstler calls this a crisis—a crisis in which people are lost in the effects of suburban sprawl from which there is little to no escape. “This crisis of place,” he

¹ James Howard Kunstler, *Geography of Nowhere: The Rise and Decline of America’s Man-Made Landscape* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 59.

² Kunstler, *Geography of Nowhere*, 246.

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says, “has led to the creation of a gigantic industry dedicated to the temporary escape from the crisis.”³ This “escape” comes in the form of places such as Las Vegas and other adult playgrounds where it is easy to ignore the effects of being disconnected from others.

This human disconnect, Kunstler maintains, also comes from the way in which American cities are laid out. A major point that Kunstler argues is that the way engineers and architectural artists design their masterpieces is very impractical. In fact, he specifically attacks modernism in Boston, and says, in *The City in Mind*, that “few architects have done as much wholesale damage to any city as the partners I. M. Pei and Harry Cobb did in Boston.”⁴ Many cities are technically and virtually unsafe for pedestrians. For example, one of Kunstler’s biggest critiques for modern cities is their streets: they are not very wide nor accommodating for pedestrians on sidewalks. The solution is simple—it would be better for both sidewalks and streets to be larger, with cars parked parallel to the street and sidewalk as a sort of protection from wrecks and other dangers of traffic. Also, as a sort of civic art, trees should be planted along the sidewalk to provide even greater protection. This would foster pedestrian enjoyment in walking along the streets as well as greater security along them. In addition to belittling the way in which cities are put together, Kunstler also describes how cities of today are rather ugly—there is nothing unique about them or worth caring about.⁵ This comes from the art of zoning in urban parts of the world. In *Home from Nowhere*, he says that what “results from zoning is suburban sprawl. Its chief characteristics are the strict separation of human activities, mandatory driving to get from one use to the other, and huge supplies of free parking.”⁶ Kunstler goes on to say that what Americans are building are cities not worth caring about. The levels of dilapidation and general unkemptness show that no one cares to keep them intact or to preserve the histories that they seemingly exude because, in short, they are not unique. Communities do not care about these suburban encroachments; they are just places to live. What little community there is has been or is being destroyed by

³ Kunstler, *Geography of Nowhere*, 217.

⁴ James Howard Kunstler, *The City in Mind: Notes on the Urban Condition* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 206.

⁵ James Howard Kunstler, *Home from Nowhere: Remaking our Everyday World for the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 22.

⁶ Kunstler, *Home from Nowhere*, 110.

zoning, and soon, entire cultures will be riddled with holes bored by suburban sprawl.⁷

At the heart of the problem of building cities not worth caring about is their overall ugliness, leading to Kunstler's overarching assertion that modern cities in the United States have no soul. According to him, suburbia mainly gains soul from the idea of civic art—creating art within cities in a manner that divulges culture. Kunstler says, “Civic art, then, is the practice of assembling human settlements so that they maximize the happiness of their inhabitants.”⁸ This means building homes in styles that are both aesthetically pleasing and still accommodating for the average American family of four. Another way that cities have no soul is how many Americans are mindless to the effects of suburban sprawl and how they have become virtually numb to the need for change. Kunstler says that Americans “have hardly paused to think about what we are so busy building, and what we have thrown away”⁹ and have lost their sense of community, which, “as it once existed in the form of places worth caring about, supported by local economies, has been extirpated by an insidious corporate colonialism that doesn't care about the places from which it extracts its profits or the people subject to its operations.”¹⁰ Summarily, suburban sprawl has created a monstrous gap in American society. The haphazard way in which urbanism mercilessly stretches across the nation is debilitating American communities and decreasing American satisfaction with itself—“Americans are suffering deeply from the centerlessness of suburbia.”¹¹

Second, James Howard Kunstler sees the end of the cheap oil era due to the blatant misuse of nonrenewable resources as a threat approaching America all too quickly. He primarily describes the end of cheap, attainable oil in *The Long Emergency*, but his other works also touch upon the subject. In fact, Kunstler says that the effects of suburban sprawl have been one of the biggest factors in the diminishing supply of resources: “America has now squandered its national wealth erecting a human habitat that, in all likelihood, will not be usable much longer, and there are few unspoiled places left to retreat to in the nation's habitable reaches.”¹² The heart of Kunstler's argument is that, first of all, there are little resources left, and, second, the American devil-may-care way

⁷ Kunstler, *Home from Nowhere*, 125.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 122.

⁹ Kunstler, *Geography of Nowhere*, 10.

¹⁰ Kunstler, *Home from Nowhere*, 22.

¹¹ Kunstler, *Geography of Nowhere*, 198.

¹² *Ibid.*, 114.

of overspending or misallocation of resources will cause a catastrophic panic never seen before—a Long Emergency.¹³

The majority of all American activity involves oil. The substance has been available to the United States for decades, but it is quickly running out as it is becoming increasingly necessary to catch up with the rate of technological advancement. Kunstler mentions in *The Long Emergency* how its discovery worldwide in the mid-twentieth century has further engrossed U.S. ignorance towards the availability of oil; its discovery in other parts of the world allows Americans to think that it could always be found in parts that would be willing to trade oil for economic development, especially in developing countries.¹⁴ This is not the case. In fact, many parts of the world, although economically oil-dependent, export oil to the U.S. at high prices. And, as Kunstler predicts, world powers may be forced to pit themselves against each other for the sake of obtaining a means to continue to uphold the standard of living. He notes this as the end to the Long Emergency—“world powers retreating into their own regional corners, left to deal with fateful contraction of their societies due to the depletion of cheap fossil fuels.”¹⁵ This belief may seem far-fetched, but Kunstler may be right. The globe is already regionalizing into economic blocs for the benefit of free trade zones and for sharing resources. Today, there are many regionalized areas in North America (NAFTA), South America (Mercosur), and Asia and Oceania (ASEAN). By joining together, these regions fortify themselves against the tentative economic fallacies of the world order. As a nonrenewable resource, fossil fuels would greatly foment the need to regionalize because their scarcity stress the economic climate.

Because the world has become so oil-dependent, its fossil fuels are depleting rapidly. Scientists are making substitutions for it. However, their substitutions are weaker or do not work at all. Oil continues to dwindle and no one seems to care. Kunstler dubs this a type of vanity, “narcissism,” even: the American oil addiction has captured a nation who seems not to be able to realize that it is even in a state of distress.¹⁶ This is how the American way of life is converging towards its own demise. This is a tragic occurrence in the Western world. What was once a beacon in the “despotic darkness of the night”¹⁷ that

¹³ James Howard Kunstler, *The Long Emergency: Surviving the Convergence of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2005), 1.

¹⁴ Kunstler, *The Long Emergency*, 43

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 64.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 61.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

helped to extend the earth's carrying capacity has now been cast aside as something that will respawn.¹⁸ This horrible management of oil and other fossil fuels is not a blatant waste of oil—it is a misallocation of resources.

Kunstler writes about how oil abundance is diminishing because the lusts of modern industrialism and materialism use it all without heeding the importance of saving. This oil is being used for wrong purposes and in perhaps the least efficient way possible, according to Kunstler: urbanization. America, though, loves urbanization. It seeks ways to build more so that life may be more comfortable, so that homes may be aplenty. This is exactly the “misallocation of resources” Kunstler deems “the colossal misinvestment that suburbia represents.”¹⁹ Instead of spending resources to build necessary things for the betterment of humanity or for creating alternatives to the resources that will soon be out of reach, suburbs are planted, all the while hurtling the nation into more debt. “We’ve spent our national wealth on an empire of junk that will soon lose even the marginal utility it may have possessed,” and instead of setting aside money and resources to build cities of value or to spread civic art, suburban sprawl creeps across the United States.²⁰ Moreover, the misallocation of resources would further put the United States as a whole into a state of despair, contributing to Kunstler’s Long Emergency. The worst part is that there seems to be no way out of the deepening hole of the Long Emergency; there is too grand an “investment in an oil-addicted way of life...that it is too late to salvage all the national wealth wasted on building it, or to continue that way of life more than a decade or so into the future.”²¹

Finally, Kunstler gives numerous examples as to how the United States, specifically the American culture, effortlessly throws itself into an abyss of materialistic consumerism; to these examples, though, he offers solutions as to how Americans may ameliorate their situation. What may help the most is a better economy, better neighborhood development, and the preservation of the countryside. Kunstler says that before a solution may be put into action there first must be a recognition of “the benefits of a well-designed realm, and the civic life that comes with it, over the uncivil, politically toxic, socially impoverished, hyper-privatized realm of suburbia.”²² With this realization, the want to create a society that merits fixing may be cultivated. How could this

¹⁸ Kunstler, *The Long Emergency*, 30.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

²⁰ Kunstler, *Home from Nowhere*, 154.

²¹ Kunstler, *The Long Emergency*, 28.

²² Kunstler, *Home from Nowhere*, 57.

current state be fixed, though? Kunstler says that we do not have proper places to live in because we are basically creating habitable places just for the sake of living. Cities do not have charm anymore; towns will have to be rebuilt, and cities must be rethought in order to promote a more advanced economy and to give life a more artistic flair.²³ Kunstler first lauds the advantages of civic art in cities. He says that if there were more civic art instead of zoning, then societies may care more about the cities in which they live. America must do away with zoning, and instead implement it as civic art: “it is distinguished from civic art especially in its lack of concern for the human scale and for human psychological needs.”²⁴ Civic art is more than just making public spaces and architecture look more attractive—it is about fostering a unique way of urbanism so that more may be inspired by it to engage in the New Urbanism movement, to promote human satisfaction. Kunstler says that attacking suburbanization with civic art is possible, that it is within our power to construct places worthy to care about.²⁵

Along with a realization of what plagues America, it is important to recognize threats that may impede progress in the right direction. As suburbia began with an increased political and economic stability, a resiliency to bad decisions and cheap oil also entrenched themselves in suburban sprawl.²⁶ With this, a sense of community was lost. Americans became focused on how much *stuff* could be attained throughout life instead of actually caring about each other. Kunstler asserts that the way in which communities are misrepresented greatly hinders the New Urbanism movement: community sounds like a good idea in theory, but the government never actually does anything to promote it.²⁷ Civic art, then, is the approach Kunstler suggests to help foster community. This entails building parks that are more than just parks; adding more to streets than just lanes and stoplights; promoting pedestrianism or at least decreasing automobilism; and increasing an overall aesthetically pleasing atmosphere among cities.

Another impediment to the progress of the New Urbanism movement is the fact that it is generally thought that Americans are complacent with their current state. This is not the case. In fact, in the United States, there is a growing overall dissatisfaction in regard to livability. Kunstler says that this is ignored

²³ Kunstler, *Geography of Nowhere*, 248.

²⁴ Kunstler, *Home from Nowhere*, 123.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 149.

²⁶ Kunstler, *The City in Mind*, 73.

²⁷ Kunstler, *Home from Nowhere*, 194.

and taken for granted; those who push for suburbia genuinely believe that people want more of it, but Kunstler thinks that their current comfortability does not mean that they will live that way forever.²⁸

Kunstler also offers cities that exemplify what he views as New Urbanism done correctly. He largely does this in *The City in Mind*, where, among thrashing diatribes, he gives account of the histories of these cities and what they have done right. For example, while ripping Atlanta and Las Vegas to shreds, Kunstler lauds Paris' wide boulevards, Rome's historical preservation, and Boston's "self-confidence and self-consciousness," which he deems as missing in other American cities.²⁹ The latter three are older, though, and have experienced much trial and error in development. Therefore, it may be that he is forgetting their rich history and age, which will overshadow any nascent sentimental value in newer cities such as Atlanta and Las Vegas. This comparison between the cities he praises and the cities he deplors makes it obvious that he sees the American way of life as a toxic entity that has wasted the raw culture of its European ancestors. The American cesspool is richest in Las Vegas, according to Kunstler: "The trouble with Las Vegas is not that it is ridiculous and dysfunctional, but that anybody might take it seriously as a model for human ecology on anything but the most extreme provisional terms."³⁰ The cities in the United States that fit Kunstler's model for a city not lost in suburban sprawl are largely found along the east coast; the west largely represents the consumerism that lies at the heart of American ideals.

In addition to offering solutions as to how suburban sprawl may be made better, Kunstler decries the oil situation yet says that although it is certain that resources are to run out, there are still actions to be taken to slow the decline of the availability of resources. The cause of the rapid decrease of resources is the onset of industrialism.³¹ Kunstler sees the Long Emergency as a sort of apocalyptic age in which there will be "diminished life spans for many of us,"³² where "America will be challenged to produce enough food for its own domestic needs"³³ and "mortality will return with a vengeance."³⁴ Kunstler advises the usual conservation of resources and the attempt to switch to alternative sources of energy so that oil may be preserved. In the future, it will help that humans

²⁸ Kunstler, *The City in Mind*, 73.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 224.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 143.

³¹ Kunstler, *The Long Emergency*, 161.

³² *Ibid.*, 11

³³ *Ibid.*, 160.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 168.

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will be forced to cut back on their consumerism, that spending will be reduced, and that imports and exports may be limited. This will, of course, severely cleave worldwide wealth, but that cutback will serve as a leveling effect that takes all other nations with it. Kunstler's main point in how the Long Emergency may be solved is that alternative energy that comes from natural gas, biomass, nuclear power, solar power, fuel cells will ultimately not work,³⁵ but "there is a possibility that humans will manage to carry on because we've been there before."³⁶

In his four works about the dangers of industrialization, James Howard Kunstler says that America is digging itself into a deep, deep hole from which it may not escape, and that the current predicament that lies before all Americans concerning the availability of oil will only worsen with time if something is not done about it soon. Kunstler calls for a society that will build homes and cities worth caring about, which will give America charm. He also seeks to change the current oil situation before we enter a heightened state of emergency in which our resources will deplete. Kunstler is avid in his writing about these two themes; his argument is one of specific concern but is well-supported by the plausibility of such events occurring. One can only hope that America becomes a place worth caring about so that Kunstler may be wrong in his assertion that one day it will meet its end under the duress of the impending oil crisis.

³⁵. Kunstler, *The City in Mind*, 74.

³⁶. Kunstler, *The Long Emergency*, 5.

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
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